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International commercial arbitration is the de facto method of solving disputes between corporations.
Multi-party and multi-contract arbitration situations have increased significantly in recent years, which
has led to arbitration institutes creating new mechanisms to increase efficiency in such situations.
However, these new rules have not been studied in-depth and compared to each other, to ascertain
possible similarities, dissimilarities, and common requirements. This thesis examines joinder,
intervention, and consolidation mechanisms at five international arbitration institutes (ʻthe FAIʼ is the
Arbitration Institute of the Finland Chamber of Commerce, ʻthe SCCʼ is the Arbitration Institute of the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, ʻThe ICCʼ is the International Chamber of Commerce International
Court of Arbitration, ʻThe HKIACʼ is the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, and ʻthe SCCAMʼ
is the Swiss Chambers of Commerce Association for Arbitration and Mediation) to ascertain common
requirements, and effects on the fairness, efficiency, and economy of international commercial
arbitration.
This thesis finds that the solutions chosen at the studied institutions are largely similar in theory and in
practice. There are four common requirements: 1) the consent requirement meaning that party
consent is demonstrable both in cases with many agreements, and in cases with non-signatories as
potential parties; 2) the timing requirement meaning that the earlier in the process the request is made
by a party, the more likely it is to succeed. Different institutions have different deadlines for involuntary
consolidation, joinder, and intervention; 3) the connectivity requirement meaning that there needs to
be a certain degree of similarity between cases and/or parties. The connectivity requirements in
relation to multi-party and multi-contract mechanisms differ among institutions studied; 4) the
procedural efficiency requirement meaning that, in addition to fulfilling the other requirements, the
request must also enhance procedural efficiency of the process or benefit the institution in some way.
Three of five institutions studied have chosen mostly similar rules; the ICC, the FAI and the HKIAC are
almost identical in their treatment of multi-party situations. Therefore, they are considered by this
thesis to be the new international standard. The SCC is significantly more restrictive than ICC, FAI and
HKIAC in allowing involuntary mechanisms. The SCCAM is most liberal of institutes studied, and
allows arbitrators a significant amount of freedom, at the cost of party autonomy and confidentiality, to
allow third-parties to intervene in arbitration proceedings, whether the third-party is directly involved in
the dispute or not.
The findings of this thesis show that multi-party and multi-contract mechanisms may increase the
effectiveness of international arbitration at a cost to party autonomy. Party autonomy is limited by
arbitration institutions nominating all arbitrators in multi-party disputes, and allowing involuntary
transformation of bi-party disputes into multi-party disputes through the mechanisms of joinder,
intervention, and consolidation. The increased efficiency is however limited to bi-polar multi-party
proceedings and is ill equipped to handle multi-polar arbitration proceedings.
The choice of an arbitration institution and consequently the process that institution follows involves
significant risks, such as longer processes, and additional costs for corporations.
Multi-party mechanisms, by themselves, do not significantly enhance the attractiveness of Finland as a
seat of arbitration. However, this thesis finds that they are necessary first step.
The conclusions in this thesis are that multi-party mechanisms are a good addition to international
commercial arbitration and should be readily adopted by institutionsʼ, but the usage of such
mechanisms should only be considered when efficiency gains outweigh the costs to party autonomy.
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1 Introduction 
1.1 General background 
International commercial arbitration has become the de facto standard method of solving 
disputes between international corporations, as the overwhelming majority of large 
corporations (88%, as of a 2008 survey)1 prefer it to international litigation, which is seen 
as costly and time-consuming.2 
In arbitration, the parties voluntarily refer their dispute to an impartial third person, an 
arbitrator who is selected by them to make a decision based on the evidence and arguments 
presented before an arbitral tribunal. The rules and process of the arbitral tribunal vary 
according to local law, institutional rules, and international practice.3 Lew defines the four 
fundamental features of arbitration: firstly, arbitration is an alternative to litigation in a 
national court; secondly, it is a private mechanism for resolving disputes; thirdly, it is 
selected and controlled by the parties; finally, the end result of arbitration is a final and 
binding determination of parties rights and obligations.4  
International commercial arbitration is an established mechanism for the final and binding 
resolution of disputes that concern a contractual or other relationship with an international 
element, by independent arbitrators, in accordance with procedures, structures, rules, and 
legal standards chosen directly or indirectly by the parties.5 
International commercial contracts are almost always subject to an arbitration clause. The 
foremost reason is that corporations are reluctant to subject themselves to the jurisdiction 
of foreign courts, which may have unfamiliar laws and procedures. Other reasons include 
enforceability, confidentiality, speed, and cost-effectiveness. 
Multi-party arbitration proceedings have become more prevalent in the last two decades. In 
2012, the ICC reported that more than a third of arbitrations involved more than two 
parties and that the average number of parties in these cases was four; in one case there 
were more than 25 parties. 57% of multiparty cases involved one claimant and several 
respondents, 26% involved several claimants and one respondent, and the remaining 17 % 
                                                
1  Mistelis & Baltag 2008b, p. 97-99.  
2 Enforcement is one of the problems of international litigation. Outside the European Union it is difficult to 
enforce foreign court decisions. States evidently see enforcement of foreign court decisions as lessening their 
sovereignity, whereas enforcement of an arbitration award is not as problematic.  
3 Lew et al. 2003, p. 3. 
4 ibid p. 3. 
5 ibid p. 3. 
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several claimants and several respondents.6 In general, about 40 % of arbitration cases 
worldwide involve more than two parties.7  
In the last few decades, multi-polar arbitrations -- that is, rather than a claimant camp and a 
respondent camp, each party may have diverging claims and interests towards the other 
parties of the arbitration -- have become more common.8 Many authors have considered 
the problems inherent to multi-party situations to be disadvantageous for arbitration.9 
Surveys have concluded that a lack of appeals and third- and multi-party mechanisms, as 
well as time and cost, were seen as the biggest drawbacks of international commercial 
arbitration.10  
Multi-party arbitration mechanisms may enhance the efficiency of the arbitration process. 
Consider the following example: A respondent group Q, (consisting of a number of 
companies, and one individual who was the majority shareholder) had sold their interests 
in the assets of various companies of Q, to a number of companies controlled by a claimant 
group, X International SA.  
The shares purchase agreement provided for application of Belgian law and ICC 
arbitration in Luxembourg in case of dispute […] various ancillary and related agreements 
were also signed. These agreements included a shareholders’ agreement concluded 
between some of the sellers who were already shareholders of the group companies, on the 
one hand, and on the other hand, new shareholders X International SA and Swiss bank (Y) 
[…] a request for arbitration was filed by the purchasers against the sellers on the basis of a 
breach of the representations and warranties. The arbitral tribunal was appointed under 
CEPANI rules […] the respondents decided to file a counterclaim against the claimants 
and bank Y, which was not a party to the arbitration. The claimants objected.  Therefore, 
the counterclaim became a separate arbitration between Bank Y and the respondents.11  
This case clearly illustrates that, if proper multi-party mechanisms had existed, then bank 
Y would have been allowed to join in the first arbitration process, rather than being forced 
into separate and costly arbitration processes. In this case the CEPANI rules allow for 
consolidation and one of the cases, was consolidated, into the other. Had the arbitration 
                                                
6 ICC 2013 
7 Voser & Schellenberg 2009, p. 343. 
8 Silva-Romero 2005, p. 77. 
9 Siig 2007, p. 74; Voser & Schellenberg 2009, p. 344; Moses 2012, p. 5. 
10 Mistelis & Baltag 2008b, p. 95. 
11 CEPANI cases No. 2176 and 2189 as cited in Hanotiau Complex Arbitrations, p. 184. 
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taken place under ICC or FAI rules in force at the time, there would have been no way to 
consolidate the two cases; neither, would joinder have been a possibility. 
Arbitration institutes worldwide have begun adopting mechanisms for dealing with multi-
party and multi-contract arbitration proceedings. The pressure to adopt such rules has come 
from the business community, as users of arbitration. The rules adopted expand the consent 
of the parties in multi-party and multi-contract cases, by creating mechanisms that allow 
for two or more cases to be consolidated, or allow for third-party participation, without the 
consent of all the parties to the arbitration. 
This thesis will study the effects of these new rules within the framework of international 
commercial arbitration and the Finnish perspective, to determine whether the new rules 
enhance the fair, effective, and economical resolution of commercial disputes. This thesis 
will also systematize the rules at studied institutions to find common requirements. 
I will now define the multi-party mechanisms studied in this thesis, and describe their 
characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages. 
1.2 What are Multi-party Mechanisms 
1.2.1 Joinder and Intervention 
In arbitration, ‘joinder’ is the joining of a third party to the arbitration process by one of 
the original parties of the arbitration process, through a procedural request. A request for 
joinder is an additional request for arbitration by the respondent towards a third party, 
either solely, or in conjunction with that filed against the claimant. Joinder may also occur 
when, at a later stage of the proceedings, the claimant decides that a third party should 
become an additional respondent.12 
When a third party accedes to bi-party arbitration, it becomes a multi-party arbitration 
proceeding. Insolvency is the most common situation for joinder requests.13  
                                                
12 Voser & Schellenberg 2009, p. 346. 
13 Hanotiau Groups of Companies, p. 279. 
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‘Intervention’ is when a third party requests to join an arbitration already in progress. If 
intervention is permitted by the relevant institutional rules or national laws, the arbitration 
institution typically requires that the request be made within a certain timeframe, after 
which the institution and/or arbitrators make the final decision as to whether the new party 
can join the arbitration in progress.  
An example of this would be a third-party guarantor, which is not directly party to the 
main agreement but has a contract with one party to the agreement. This is less 
burdensome towards the interested party than would be first starting a new arbitration and 
then requesting that this arbitration be consolidated with the arbitration already in progress.  
A B 
A B
A B 
C 
C 
Figure 1: The situation when intervention or joinder occurs. (Source: Author) 
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1.2.2 Consolidation 
In arbitration, ‘consolidation’ refers to the act or process of uniting into one case several 
independent proceedings that are pending or have been initiated.14 The rules of the 
arbitration institute, the contents of arbitration clause, and the laws of the seat of arbitration 
present different requirements and procedures for consolidation. In general, a request for 
consolidation is sent to the arbitration institute, by one or several of the parties to the 
arbitrations which are to be consolidated.  
Thereafter the arbitral institution, arbitrator, or national court (depending on the situation 
and applicable rules) will examine the request and decide if the proceedings in question 
meet the requirements for consolidation. 
1.2.3 Cross-claims 
In arbitration, a ‘cross-claim’ is a respondent’s claim against another respondent within the 
same arbitration proceeding. The principal difference is that cross-claims do not add other 
parties to the arbitration, but rather add new claims between parties.  
According to Voser, cross-claims are often a claim in guarantee or in damages; for 
example, a claim by a sub-contractor against another sub-contractor when the main 
contractor has started an arbitration proceeding against both.15 
 
Due to the limitations of this thesis, I have chosen to not examine cross-claims; although 
they are important, their potential for enhancing arbitration is smaller than joinder, 
                                                
14 Pair & Frankenstein 2011, p. 1063; Zuberbuehler et al. 2005, p. 36. 
15 Voser & Schellenberg 2009,p. 358. 
A B A C 
B 
A 
C 
Figure 2: Consolidation (Source: Author) 
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intervention, and consolidation, which are therefore the mechanisms on which I have 
chosen to focus. 
I will now briefly examine some of the advantages and disadvantages of these multi-party 
mechanisms. 
1.2.4 Advantages and disadvantages 
Fair, efficient, and economical commercial justice benefits from efficient arbitration 
proceedings. Mechanisms that allow for joinder, intervention, consolidation and cross-
claims may enhance efficiency because: 
1) they prevent inconsistent and conflicting decisions;16 and help counteract problems 
related to preclusion;  
2) arbitrators get a more complete picture of a transaction and the parties obligations 
towards each other; 17 and 
3) duplicate proceedings are a waste of time and money.18   
However, there are disadvantages to parties in cases where one party’s involvement is not 
substantial in the dispute. As Ten Cate and others have noted, for these parties, 
consolidated proceedings are more time-consuming and costly than separate arbitration 
proceedings dealing with just their claims.19 This may lead to situations where one party 
would try to intimidate another with the possibility of consolidation and a costly and 
complex process.20  
A second disadvantage is the loss of confidentiality, because the more parties are involved, 
the more parties are privy to confidential information that is shared during the arbitration 
proceedings.21 These problems can be resolved through confidentiality agreements or other 
legal instruments, before or during the proceedings.22  
A third disadvantage of multi-party mechanisms is the loss of the ability for parties to 
select their preferred arbitrator (as explained in greater detail later in this thesis). A fourth 
disadvantage is the lack of strategic multi-shot arrangements, which mean that parties 
                                                
16 Ten Cate 2004, p. 138. For conflicting decisions see for example: Interbulk Limited v. Aiden Shipping 
Compay Limited. 
17 Lew et al. 2003, p. 378; Nicklisch 1994, p. 63-64. 
18 ibid p. 378. 
19 Stipanowich 1987, p. 505; Ten Cate 2004, 133, p. 138. 
20 Schwartz 1993,  p. 343. 
21 See for example: Lew et al. 2003, p. 408; and Ten Cate 2004, p. 138. 
22 Strong 1998, p. 933-934. 
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might otherwise have multiple possibilities to try the same dispute as well as preclusion 
related problems (as explained in greater detail later in this thesis). 
However, as Ten Cate points out, the burdens resulting from multi-party mechanisms 
should not be exaggerated.23 Consolidation should only be considered when there are 
common issues of law and fact arising from related transactions, where the evidence will 
often be the same regardless of the number of parties in the proceedings.24  
The suitability of consolidation, joinder, or intervention in a particular case should be 
determined based on whether the benefits of bringing all parties and claims together in a 
single proceeding outweigh the disadvantages.25 The alternative may also be a de facto 
consolidation, meaning that the arbitration institution nominates the same arbitrators across 
the different disputes between the parties, since this will often solve the problem of 
conflicting decisions by arbitral panels. 
As Born aptly concludes: “The decision whether or not to consolidate two or more 
arbitrations, or to permit joinder or intervention, is an issue that involves issues of case 
management and procedural efficiency and fairness that are quintessentially (sic) for 
arbitral resolution.”26 
1.3 Perspective 
I have chosen to view international commercial arbitration as a global system of justice 
with three distinct levels (illustrated in Figure 3.) Kurkela & Turunen state that there is a 
core of material that is common for a great majority of trading nations, the so-called lex 
mercatoria, which floats above all jurisdictions and horizontally covers many parts of 
national laws and regulations. The differences in material laws relating to business are 
often superficial, and although there are different processes, the end results are strikingly 
similar.27 
Arbitration forms part of lex mercatoria, and is therefore part of this floating global 
system. The reason for this is that arbitration is, at its core, a contractual mechanism. 
Furthermore, the institutions are international, and the international arbitration community 
adapts rules discussed in the international arena into the practice of a more national 
                                                
23 Ten Cate 2004, 133, p. 139. 
24 Stipanowich 1987,  p. 505. 
25 Ten Cate 2004, 133, p. 139. 
26  Born 2009, p. 2091. 
27  Kurkela & Turunen 2010, p. 5. 
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character. Due to the substantial international norms and soft-law of an international 
nature, it is fair to say that the law of arbitration is uniquely international, according to 
Kurkela & Turunen.28 
This thesis views international arbitration as a three-level system, with level that are 
independent but connected. The aim is to help develop a wider and more easily identifiable 
uniformity in the arbitration system and its procedures, or, as Kurkela & Turunen define it, 
lex proceduralia.29 
Figure 3 illustrates this system. The global level, which floats above, is where the 
arbitration institutions and the international arbitration community reside. The second 
transnational level is signified by its main inhabitant, the New York Convention, which 
provides the core rules of arbitration both to the global level and to the national level. The 
third level is that of the states, whose courts oversee the procedural rights and enforce the 
awards. Furthermore, for the purpose of this thesis, I will view this three-level system from 
two distinct perspectives: that of the system, and that of the user perspective. 
 
                                                
28 ibid p. 7-8. 
29 ibid p. 8. 
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1.4 Purpose  
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the recent developments of multi-party and multi-
contract arbitration mechanisms from the perspective of the global arbitration system and 
its users. The focus is on party consent, both to the arbitration agreement and to the rules of 
the arbitral institutions.  
The main hypothesis of this thesis is that consolidation, joinder, and intervention enhance 
the effectiveness of arbitration proceedings, from both the users’ and the system’s 
perspective, and should be encouraged on all levels, national, transnational and global.  
Thus, the research questions of this thesis are i) to compare and evaluate whether the 
different solutions chosen at arbitration institutions with regards to multi-party 
System User 
International Commercial Arbitration 
Global Legal System 
Transnational  
National legal systems 
 
 
National Courts 
Arbitration 
Institutes 
The New York Convention 
Recognition and Enforcement 
Requirements Decision 
 
Law
 of the Seat 
Enforceable award 
Figure 3: The levels and perspectives of this thesis (Source: Author) 
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mechanisms enhance the effectiveness of arbitration proceedings by expanding party 
consent; and ii) to evaluate whether multi-party arbitration mechanisms can improve the 
attractiveness of Finland as a seat of arbitration. 
To reach these objectives I will create a theoretical framework for analysis and then 
undertake a functional study of the relevant rules and practices of international arbitration, 
both in general and particularly at five international arbitral institutions, so as to discover 
the practical requirements for consolidation, joinder, and intervention, as well as evaluate 
the state of regulation in Finland. 
1.5 Outline 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the materials and methods used in 
this dissertation. Chapter 3 introduces Finnish arbitration law and practice. In Chapter 4, 
the principles of arbitration are examined from the perspective of multi-party arbitration 
mechanisms. A study and discussion on multi-party and multi-contract arbitration rules at 
the five arbitration institutes studied is undertaken in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 is a practical 
guide for the users of arbitration. Chapter 7 examines the effect of multi-party rules on 
Finland as a seat of arbitration.  
1.6 Multi-party constellations 
There are two main types of multi-party arbitration: bi-polar and multipolar. Both will be 
presented below. Each concept is illustrated by a figure on the basis of a typical case. 
1.6.1 Bi-polar multi-party proceeding 
A bi-polar multi-party arbitration is similar to normal bi-party arbitration, because the 
parties are organized into a claimant camp and a respondent camp. Each camp may have 
claims and counter-claims towards the other camp, but within the each camp, all parties 
have the same interests. For example: in the construction industry, bi-polar multi-party 
arbitrations are normal, because guarantors (C) and primary contractors (B) are often in 
one camp while the owner (A) is in the other. 
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1.6.2 Multi-polar arbitration proceeding 
Multi-polar multi-party arbitration on the other hand is problematic, because arbitration 
was conceived as a dispute resolution mechanism between two parties. In a multi-party 
multi-polar arbitration, the parties may have divergent interests. In practice, this means that 
parties in the same arbitration often have cross-claims against each other (figure 5). 
Arbitration institutions have historically been very reluctant to entertain multi-party 
arbitrations. Redfern & Hunter among others have noted it is generally desirable to deal 
with all issues in a singular proceeding, rather than in a series of separate proceedings, as 
this saves time and money. More importantly, it also avoids the problems of conflicting 
decisions on the same issues of law and fact, since the same tribunal determines all 
issues.30   
                                                
30 Redfern & Hunter 2009, p. 149. 
A B 
C 
Figure 4: Bi-polar multi-party arbitration (Source: Author) 
A B 
C 
Figure 5: Multipolar arbitration (Source: Author) 
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Multi-party and multi-contract arbitrations come in many forms. The following is a 
presentation of some of the most prolific. 
1.6.3 Single contract with multiple parties 
This is perhaps the most classical example 
where multi-party arbitrations occur, as several 
parties have signed an agreement together, 
which contains an arbitration clause.  
A classical example is a joint venture 
agreement with multiple parties and a single 
arbitration clause. Other examples are standard 
contracts within the building and shipping 
industry. 
 
1.6.4 Multiple contracts between parties 
Long-standing commercial ventures between parties often necessitate a multitude of 
contractual undertakings. Thus, parties may find themselves with a dispute that covers 
more than one contract and even several different arbitration clauses. This is often referred 
to as a complex contractual web of obligations between parties.  
A classic example is a contract involving a guarantee clause, or stipulation in favor of a 
third party. If A has a contract to provide machines to B, and A makes a parallel contract 
with C to provide B with service for said machines, then prima facie these may seem like 
§ 
A  B 
 C 
Figure 7: Multiple contracts between two parties. 
(Source: Author) 
A C B D 
JVA 
Figure 6: Joint Venture Agreement (Source: 
Author) 
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to separate contracts; however, in the contract between A and be contain engagements with 
regards to C, and the contract between A and C contains engagements with regards to B, 
and C has ratified the contract and performed obligations under said contract, then it 
becomes a triangular A-B-C contract. If both contracts contain a similar arbitration clause, 
claims can brought to the same arbitration proceeding for all disputes related to both 
contracts.31 
1.6.5 String arbitration 
String arbitration is usually used in disputes regarding the subsequent sale of goods whose 
quality has been contested. In string arbitration, all contracts are identical except for the 
parties and the price. They all refer to the same set of arbitration rules. The award is 
rendered between the first seller and the last buyer, and is binding for all string-partners. 
An example of this can be found in Grain and Food Trade Association standard 
agreement.32  
  
                                                
31 For case examples see:  Hanotiau Complex Arbitrations, p. 15; and Townsend 2006, p. 20. 
32 Sanders 1999, p. 212. 
A B C D E 
Figure 8: Illustrates a string arbitration, where all parties are bound. (Source: 
Author) 
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2 Methods and Materials 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is a short explanation of the methodology used in this thesis. The choice of 
method cannot be made in isolation, as there are always reasons for the method chosen. 
The choice of method for this thesis is practical, by which I mean the methods chosen are 
those that are able to help answer the main research questions best. Method in this context 
means an orderly and systematic manner in which research is done and thus, methodology 
deals with the questions concerning methods.33  
2.2 Legal Dogmatics 
The main method used in this thesis is legal dogmatics (or constructive jurisprudence), 
which aims to interpret and systemize legal norms with the aid of legal sources. It views 
the legal order from within and seeks to answer the question what is the content of 
applicable law at this moment -- in other words, praxis, through the analysis of legal 
sources.34 The scope of legal sources is dependent on the object of interpretation and 
systematization. According to Tuori, legal sources themselves give symbolic language-
based information on the contents of the legal order.35 Traditional Finnish legal literature 
has advocated for a strict and rigid hierarchy between the various legal sources, because 
this creates a strong legal certainty.36  
The object of examination in this thesis requires a more flexible and situationally aware 
approach. Flexible legal dogmatics as developed by Karhu is suitable for the situation at 
hand. In Karhu’s modern approach, legal dogmatics adopts a situational awareness, 
meaning that it focuses on the behaviors, rather than the rules, of a situation. This 
situational awareness does not exclude rules-based jurisprudence; rather, rules become 
important once the situation and the relevant rule-space have been identified.37 Knuts states 
in his dissertation that adequate interpretation and systematization is in line with traditional 
                                                
33  Husa 2006, p. 1096. 
34  Aarnio 1978, p. 52. 
35 Tuori 2003, p. 50. 
36 Traditionally the law itself is the most important legal source, thereafter decisions by the Supreme Court 
and travaux preparatoires, recently this strict hierarchy has accepted EU law and court praxis into the highest 
levels of the hierarchy. For a discussion on the recent developments regarding legal sources in Finnish legal 
dogmatics see for example: Ari Hirvonen. 'Mitkä metodit' (2011) - Opas oikeustieteen metodologiaan. 
Yleisen oikeustieteen julkaisuja  
37 Karhu 2003, p. 36-38. 
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legal dogmatics and as such requires contacts and interpretation of the context and 
application of rules (of law).38  
International commercial arbitration is a multi-level system with three distinct levels of 
study.39 Thus, research into arbitration necessitates flexible and situational view on legal 
sources. The core principles and rules of the arbitration process are global, but they have 
local distinctive qualities that may influence the outcome. This global floating system and 
the local system may have distinctly different legal sources depending on the situation.40 
The global arbitration system derives its jurisdiction from consent, and that consent is 
controlled at the local level by national authorities. The national levels are situational, 
meaning that different states have different rules regarding arbitration. For example, one 
state may accept an oral arbitration agreement as binding consent, while another state will 
not even consider this. There can be no arbitration without consent, and consent has many 
situational rules. 
The arbitration process at an institution is a separate situation, with its own rules and 
culture, depending on the institute in question. The end result of this process is an award, 
which, if it conforms to the rules and requirements of the New York Convention becomes 
enforceable in most countries. However, there are aspects of enforcement and recognition 
that have a situational character and need to be studied and systematized. The New York 
Convention transitions the global arbitration legal systems decision into a locally 
enforceable form.41 
The examination is conducted in many different situations that necessitate the flexible 
interpretation of legal sources and their binding character on the situation at hand. At the 
national level, normal legal dogmatics with its rigid hierarchy is appropriate. The most 
important sources are the binding laws of arbitration and contracts, as well as other 
relevant laws. In addition, Supreme Court praxis and travaux préparatoires are used.  
The second level of study is the New York Convention and its requirements that form the 
de facto legal requirements of arbitration, when they are applied locally, through the 
recognition and enforcement mechanisms included in the Convention. The most important 
                                                
38 Knuts 2010, p.49. 
39 See Chapter 1.3 for more information. 
40 Kurkela & Turunen 2010, p. 8-12. 
41 It is interesting to note that the recognition of arbitral awards is almost universal in comparison to the 
recognition of foreign court decisions, which outside of the European Union is quite difficult. Recognition of 
arbitral awards is not seen as a restriction on national sovereignty in the same way as the recognition of a 
foreign court award would be. 
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sources identified are the convention itself and its travaux préparatoires as well as opinio 
iuris. 
On the third level of study is the international commercial arbitration system, from the 
institutional perspective. This arbitration system forms its own separate legal system, with 
its own rules and regulations. The most important sources are: 1) the rules themselves; 2) 
published cases; 3) documents prepared by the arbitral institutions; 4) laws of the seat of 
arbitration; and 5) articles written by authors close to the institutions. There is no concrete 
hierarchy between these legal sources, because relevant rules depend on the situation at 
hand.  
The goal of this thesis is to examine and systematize the rules of arbitration at the studied 
institutions. Therefore, I will compare the relevant rules of multi-party and multi-contract 
arbitration at these institutions, in order to help systematize the arbitration system and 
discover possible standards. The perspective adopted is internal and therefore compatible 
with flexible legal dogmatics.  
The functional evaluation that will help systematize the different solutions at arbitration 
institutes can be summed up in the following way: 
1) Pose a functional question on how problem X is solved; 
2) List the similarities and differences in ways of solving X at the studied institutions; 
3) Consider the similarities and differences; 
4) Evaluate the solutions and judge which, if any, is best, or fashion a superior synthesis 
solution; 
5) Critically evaluate the research and its results. 
The method is somewhat similar to methods used in comparative legal studies.42 It is 
important to study not only the rules themselves but also the context of those rules, 
because there may be institutions, extralegal phenomena, unwritten rules of commerce that 
perform the same function in the foreign legal system, or in this case at the different 
arbitration institutes. 43 I intend to use the functional evaluation to examine the solutions 
                                                
42 Gerber 2001;Husa 2013, p.60 
43 See for example:  See For example: Husa 2006, p.1095;Husa 2013;Zweiger & Kötz, p. 38; To summarize: 
Husa has summed up the functional method of comparative legal studies in the following way: 1) Pose a 
functional question on how socio-legal problem X is solved; 2) List the similarities and differences in ways 
of solving X in the studied legal systems; 3) Adopt a new point of view from which to consider the 
similarities and differences; and 4) Evaluate the discoveries made and perhaps judge which of the solutions 
offered is “best”. Or perhaps fashion a solution that is superior to all others. Zweigert & Kötz furthermore 
stress the need to critically evaluate the comparative research and its results. 
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chosen for the problem of multi-party and multi-contract situations at the studied 
arbitration institutes. 
In conclusion, this thesis adopts a flexible and situational legal dogmatics as the primary 
method used in this thesis. In conjunction with this method, a functional evaluation on how 
different arbitration institutes have solved the problem of multi-party and multi-contract 
arbitration situations is undertaken.  
2.3 Material 
The materials used in this thesis are the relevant rules, or proposed rules, of the studied 
arbitral institutions, as well as relevant case material, theoretical academic writing, and 
discussions with prominent advocates. 
Gathering materials on the global legal system of arbitration from the arbitration 
institutions is difficult, since most of them do not publish cases, and even those that do 
only publish a small subset of cases each year. Therefore, examining the actual praxis of 
those institutions relies on second-hand material, such as handbooks and books by authors 
close to the institutions. Thus, it is important to critically evaluate the conclusions, which 
can be drawn from such material, since second-hand material rarely tells the entire story.  
Materials regarding the transnational and national level are easier to gather, because they 
are mostly public materials, such as court cases, laws, and travaux préparatoires. Thus, 
there is more legal certainty in the conclusions reached. 
2.4 Institutions studied 
The functional evaluation in this thesis focuses on the following institutions and their rules 
as of 1.12.2013: 
(1) The ICC has enacted new arbitration rules that came into effect on the 1st of January 
2012, the first change since 1998. In the new rules there is a section on multi-party 
arbitration that concerns the joinder of additional parties, claims between multiple 
parties, multiple contracts and the consolidation of arbitrations.44  
(2) The Swiss Chambers of Commerce Association for Arbitration and Mediation (the 
“SCCAM”) has revised the Swiss Rules of International Arbitration (the “Swiss 
Rules”), which have taken effect on the 1st of June 2012. 
                                                
44 Articles 7 - 10 of the  ICC Rules 
  18 
(3) The Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (the “HKIAC”) is also conducting a 
revision of its rules. HKIAC has enacted the new rules from the 1st of January 2013.  
(4) The Arbitration Institute of the Finland Chamber of Commerce (the “FAI Institute”) 
has been working on new rules (the “FAI Rules”), which have been enacted on the 1st 
of June 2013.  
(5) The Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (the “SCC 
Institute”) whose most recent rules (the “SCC Rules”) entered into force on 1st of 
January 2010. 
Other institutions mentioned are the London Court of International Arbitration (the 
“LCIA”), the Belgian Centre for Arbitration and Mediation (the “CEPANI”), the Conflict 
Management Institute of the University of Helsinki (the “COMI”),  
  19 
3 The Finnish perspective 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is a brief introduction in Finnish arbitration law and practice in the context of 
multi-party and multi-contract arbitration proceedings. Commercial arbitration has a long 
history in Finland. For example, the Arbitration Institute of the Finland Chamber of 
Commerce (the “FAI”) was established in 1911.45  According to Möller, about 100 arbitral 
awards are made every year in Finland, and the vast majority are ones where at least one 
party is Finnish.46 The FAI received 69 arbitration requests in 2012.47 
The Finnish arbitration act48 enacted in 1992 provides a general framework for arbitral 
proceedings that take place in Finland, as well as enforcement procedures of foreign 
awards. Finland has ratified the New York Convention, as well as all other relevant 
conventions relating to arbitration.49 
3.2 Finland and the Model Law 
The UNCITRAL model law (the “Model Law”) contains no provisions for consolidation, 
joinder and intervention. Rules regarding multi-party and multi-contract arbitration 
proceedings were considered for both the 1985 version and the updated 2006 revision, but 
were rejected.  
In the absence of specific provisions for consolidation, joinder, and intervention, they are 
subject to the Model Law’s basic requirements on enforcement and recognition in 
accordance with parties intentions and consent.50  Several states have adopted additional 
statutes on multi-party and multi-contract that provide courts or arbitral tribunals with 
powers to allow for third-party participation and consolidation.51  
                                                
45 http://arbitration.fi/en/; The FAI is by no means the only institute that offers arbitration in Finland. The 
University of Helsinki Conflict Management Institute also offers arbitration services. (See for example: 
http://www.comi.fi) 
46  Möller 1984 (Updated 2008), p. 1. 
47 Lehtinen & Yildiz 2013, p. 53. 
48 Laki välimiesmenettelystä, 23.10.1992/967 
49 Finland has ratified the following international treaties related to arbitration: Protocol on Arbitration 
Clauses (Geneva, 24 Sept. 1923);Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Geneva, 26 Sept. 
1927); General Act of Arbitration (Pacific Settlement of International Disputes) (Geneva, 26 Sept. 1928); 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”) 
(10 June 1958);Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between States and nationals of other 
States (Washington, 18 March 1965); Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE 
(Stockholm, 15 Dec. 1992). 
50 Born 2009, p. 2076. 
51 ibid p. 2076. 
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Finland does not follow the UNCITRAL Model Law, but has compatible national 
regulations. Arbitration in Finland is governed by the Finnish arbitration act (the “FAA”), 
which does not contain any rules on multi-party or multi-contract arbitration proceedings. 
The rest of this chapter will deal with key differences between the Model Law and the 
Finnish arbitration act, from the point of view of complex arbitration proceedings. 
The FAA is applied to both domestic and international arbitrations. The act is applicable to 
all civil and commercial disputes that can be referred to arbitration for binding decision.52 
In contrast, the Model Law is focused on international commercial arbitration, meaning 
that the arbitration must have an international character, such as one or more foreign 
parties. 
The FAA requires that the arbitration agreement be in writing as a separate document, 
included in another document, or included in electronic communications.53 The Model 
Law is identical. Compared to the Swedish Arbitration Act, that allows for oral 
acquiescence of an arbitration clause. 
The Model Law restricts national courts’ jurisdiction in arbitration matters, by expressly 
stating where national courts can interfere.54 The FAA contains no such provision, but the 
jurisprudence of the Finnish Supreme Court is restrictive, with the exception of procedural 
rights and consent. 
An illustrative example is Article 16 of the Model Law that grants arbitral tribunals the 
right to rule on jurisdiction, but provides the parties with right of appeal to a national court. 
The FAA provides an equal right of appeal through § 42, which grants courts the right to 
set aside an award if the arbitral tribunal has exceeded its authority. The most recent case 
involving arbitration is KKO 2013:84, where the question of binding a non-signatory to the 
main agreement was accepted in circumstances where the party had derived the benefits in 
question through that agreement. The arbitral tribunal had not exceeded its authority. 
Finland has adopted the New York Convention. The FAA and the Model Law are therefore 
identical in rules for setting aside awards.55 Both also provide for interim measures granted 
by a competent national court.56  
                                                
52 FAA § 2 
53 Möller 1997, p. 18-19. 
54 Article 5 of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
55 Which will be dealt with later in this thesis, in chapter 4.3. 
56 FAA § 5 (2) and Model Law Chapter IV 
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Neither the FAA nor the Model Law contain regulations on the appointment of arbitrators 
in multi-party situations. However, both regulatory models provide for the possibility of 
courts appointing arbitrators if parties cannot agree on appointments.57 
3.3 Conclusions 
As Möller clearly states “The 1992 Act is to a large extent compatible with the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of 1985 despite the fact that it applies 
without distinction to both domestic and international arbitration.”58 
Neither the FAA nor the Model Law contains any relevant clauses with regards to multi-
party arbitration proceedings. Therefore, there is no authoritative regulation on the conduct 
of multi-party arbitration proceedings. This means that it is up to the individual arbitration 
clauses, or the arbitral institution rules, to determine the extent of party consent.59  
                                                
57 FAA § 15 and Model Law Article 11. 
58  Möller 1984 (Updated 2008),  p. 1.  
59 There has recently been some discussion in Finland at different forums on the idea of adopting the Model 
Law in Finland. This discussion is interesting, partly because Finnish law is already compatible with the New 
York Convention and partly because it would not change anything. It seems that it is a question of public 
relations, because explaining that we have our own system is much harder, than just saying we follow the 
Model Law and that is the end of the discussion with foreign parties. With regards to complex arbitration 
proceedings the basic Model Law does not contain any regulations on those matters. 
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4 Principles of international commercial arbitration 
4.1 Introduction 
The objective of any arbitration process is to provide fair, efficient, and economical justice 
to the parties of that process. International commercial arbitration has few absolute rules, 
but many principles to be balanced against each other to reach this objective.  
In this chapter I will examine the principles of international commercial arbitration in the 
context of multi-party and multi-contract arbitration proceedings. The principles form the 
ground upon which international commercial arbitration as a legal institution rests. The 
weighing and balancing of principles is difficult, and dependent on institutional support 
and in casu determination of applicability. The principles form the arbitrators’ toolbox and 
help determine what is important in a particular case.60  
This chapter will answer how the principles of international commercial arbitration should 
be applied in order to provide fair, efficient, and economical justice in multi-party and 
multi-contract arbitration proceedings. ‘Fair’ means that party autonomy and due process 
are respected; ‘efficient’ means an enforceable award and procedural efficiency of the 
adjudication; ‘economical’ means duration and costs are kept reasonable. Fair, efficient, 
and economical justice, as defined in this chapter, is used to measure chosen solutions in 
later chapters.  
There are three levels in the global arbitration system, and these principles have differing 
reach at each level.  The levels I have identified are the global, the transnational and the 
local. I will focus on the global and transnational levels, but also reference the local level 
in Finland and other countries, where appropriate.  
Companies choose arbitration because it is fair, efficient, and economical.61 The guiding 
objective of international commercial arbitration community must be to safeguard the key 
advantages of arbitration as compared to litigation. The principles of international 
commercial arbitration are an expression of this objective. 
This chapter is divided into the following subchapters: the first subchapter deals with 
consent, which has often been described as the main obstacle to effective multi-party and 
multi-contract arbitration proceedings. The second subchapter deals with enforceability 
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under the New York Convention with regards to multi-party and multi-contract arbitration 
awards. The third subchapter deals with due process in multi-party and multi-contract 
arbitration. The fourth subchapter deals with speed and cost effectiveness. This chapter 
concludes with a synthesis that ties the examined principles into the guiding objective of 
fair, efficient, and economical justice. 
4.2 Consent is the cornerstone of arbitration 
“Who is a party to the [arbitration] clause, or has adhered to it, or eventually is estopped 
from contending that it has not adhered to it. This is in other words a classic problem of 
contract law. The real issue therefore becomes whether international commercial 
arbitration, given its specific character […] one should follow the same rules as 
applicable to ordinary civil and commercial cases or adopt a more liberal approach: and 
in the latter case what approach should be adopted.”62 
Consent is the most important requirement of all arbitration. The jurisdiction of the arbitral 
tribunal is derived from the consent of the parties. If there is no consent, either explicit or 
implicit, there can be no arbitration.  
The jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal is derived solely from an agreement between the 
parties; this forms the basis of the tribunal’s competence, i.e. the space in which it can 
make decisions. This is in stark contrast to court litigation, where state courts have 
authoritative jurisdiction over the parties and can order consolidations or allow third-party 
participation without the consent of the parties.63  
Arbitration agreements between two signature parties rarely lead to problems with consent. 
However, it has become more common that single commercial projects have many parties 
and not all of them have signed agreements containing arbitration clauses. Consider the 
following example: Companies A and B have a shareholder agreement that gives 
individual C the right to purchase shares at a certain time for a certain price (an option). C 
is not a signatory to the original agreement. If a dispute on the option arises, the question 
remains whether C, who has not explicitly signed the arbitration agreement, is bound by 
such an arbitration agreement.  
                                                
62 Hanotiau 2001, p. 254. 
63 Voser & Schellenberg 2009, p. 349-350. 
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The question I will examine in this subchapter is when third parties, such as C in the 
example above, who are not signatories to the agreement, can still be bound by the 
arbitration agreement. This is referred to as extension in arbitration literature. 
4.2.1 The basics of extension 
There are no parties to arbitration without consent. Consent may be expressed explicitly by 
signing the contract containing an arbitration clause and becoming a party to the 
agreement. However, it is possible to become a party to a contract without signing such a 
document; conversely, a signature, in itself does not always signify consent.64 In general, 
signing the underlying agreement will signify that the company has consented to the 
arbitration agreement.65 Problems arise when there are third parties that are not mentioned 
in the agreement, but are nonetheless part of the performance of an economic transaction. 
In certain circumstances those parties have implicitly consented to the agreement. 
How should arbitrators or courts approach the task of bringing in the “less-than-obvious” 
parties? As Park states, this is the most relevant question.66 Courts and arbitral tribunals 
determine party’s implicit consent, or lack thereof, by thoroughly analyzing the facts of the 
case.67 It is also necessary to determine the personal scope of the arbitration agreement, 
and whether it may be extended to the third party through one of the theories developed by 
arbitral tribunals and courts.68  In literature, such implicit consent has been found through: 
a) oral acceptance, signed or unsigned letters, or other communications; b) conduct, such 
as shipping or accepting goods; and c) through acquiescence, such as failing to object to 
statements of other parties.69  
Consent is given and determined locally at a national level, both when arbitration takes 
place in a country and when an arbitral award is enforced. Lack of consent means any 
action taken, either by the parties or an arbitral tribunal, is null and void.  Finnish 
jurisprudence is restrictive with regards to implicit consent to an arbitration agreement. 
The Finnish Supreme Court recently decided 70  that a non-signatory party could be 
considered to have implicitly consented to an agreement containing an arbitration clause, if 
the entirety of the dispute is derived from benefits that agreement would grant this party.  
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The specifics of the case KKO 2013:84 are as follows: an agreement between J Oy and M 
Oy  (two corporations) gave individual A the option to purchase shares of J Oy at a certain 
time for a fixed price. If A did not use this option, then other shareholders, or the company 
itself would be eligible to purchase the shares. The agreement contained an arbitration 
clause. J Oy had already sold the shares to a third party, denying A the option to buy the 
shares in accordance with the agreement. The question was whether J Oy could assert that 
A was bound by the arbitration clause when the claim A was raising in front of the court 
were all based on the agreement between J Oy and M Oy. A had not personally signed the 
agreement between J Oy and M Oy containing the arbitration clause. The Finnish Supreme 
Court decided that even though A was not a party to the arbitration agreement, and had not 
consented to a written arbitration agreement after the dispute arose. The agreement still 
binds A, because all of the claims for damages that A asserts are based on a breach of the 
agreement containing the arbitration clause. Therefore, the Supreme Court found that it 
was a contractual dispute and the arbitration clause was valid and binding upon A in this 
dispute.71 
There are several different methods, which courts and arbitral institutions have developed 
to decide whether a party has consented to an arbitration clause. The theories presented in 
this chapter are: 1) representation; 2) agency-theory; 3) good faith and estoppel; 4) 
transfers; 5) conduct; and 6) group companies. 
4.2.2 Representation 
A representative who signs an agreement binds the entity, which is being represented.72 
When B formally represents A in signing a contract wherein A is to be bound, the mandate 
given to B may either be expressed or implied. There must therefore be an express or 
apparent mandate. See for example case ICC award 6519 of 1991, where a special-purpose 
holding vehicle created only for an Anglo-French joint venture was subject to a joinder 
because it had participated in the negotiations leading to the agreement and was central in 
                                                
71 A similar case is KKO 1996:27 where a franchising contract between Rautakirja Oy and the entrepreneur 
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arbitration never being convened, since he would be unable to pay the security. This would have left Pertti K 
in a situation, where there was no legal recourse available to him. He would have been denied access to 
justice.  
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the negotiations. Two other parties were refused joinder.73  This is often called agency-
doctrine in civil law countries. 
The mandate requirement has several consequences: if the signatory entity is without legal 
personality, the owner or parent company is bound by the agreement. The same situation 
arises if an individual enters into contract on behalf of a corporation that does not exist. 
Furthermore, arbitration clauses may not be extended to a second defendant on the basis 
that its president signed the agreement, if he was only acting as a representative of the first 
defendant.74 Representation must be proven, without evidence to support the claim that the 
party was contracted as an agent on behalf of others, and then the claim must be 
dismissed.75 
There is also the case of apparent mandate or ostensible authority that is sometimes 
mentioned. An example of this is ICC case no. 1434 of 1975, where the tribunal concluded 
that: “Mr. A had led the national company of state B to justifiably believe that he engaged 
all the companies of the group he managed.”76 The arbitral tribunal found on this basis and 
other factual findings that the national company of State B had in fact contracted with 
Group A. 
4.2.3 Agency-theory 
In the United States, however, there is a more liberal interpretation of consent, and agency- 
theory is perhaps most commonly cited basis for non-signatories claiming the benefits of 
an agreement to arbitrate. According to U.S Restatement (Second) of Agency 1 §: 
“Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one 
person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and 
consent by other to so act.”77 
Court and arbitral tribunals in the United States therefore often contend that when parties 
to an arbitration clause intend to arbitrate all disputes which might arise, their agreement 
should be applied to all claims against agents or entities related to the signatories.78 
However, as Hanotiau notes, this is not followed in all U.S. jurisdictions to the same 
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degree. The U.S courts do however recognize and assert the five different theories by 
which a party can be forced to arbitrate, if the facts of the case support it.79 The five 
theories are agency, assumption, estoppel, third-party beneficiary, and piercing the 
corporate veil. 
According to Townsend, U.S. courts have become more restrictive in their treatment of 
non-signatories, compared with the decade from 1990-2000.80 In the case of InterGen v. 
Grina81, which Townsend refers to as a prime example, where the claimant contended that 
each of the five theories accepted in American courts applied: a) InterGen was bound 
because of its contracting subsidiary; b) Intergen was bound because it had asserted rights 
as a third-party beneficiary of the contracts; c) that Intergen should be estopped from 
denying its obligation to arbitrate, because the claims were founded and intertwined with 
contracts containing arbitration clauses; and d) that Intergen should be required to arbitrate, 
because the contracts containing the arbitration clauses were signed by its agent.82 
However, the District Court found that even though the legal theories advanced by the 
claimant were valid bases for requiring arbitration of the dispute, none of them achieved 
the objective in this particular case. The court reasoned as follows:  
That ”courts should be extremely cautious about forcing arbitration in ‘situations in which 
the identity of the parties who have agreed to arbitrate is unclear’…. [N]o party to this 
case, plaintiff or defendant, is a signatory to any of the five agreements. Thus, if ALSTOM 
is to invoke any of the designated arbitration clauses against InterGen, it must somehow 
go beyond the four corners of the agreements themselves and show both that it is entitled 
to the agreements' benefits and that InterGen is obliged to shoulder their burdens.”83 
4.2.4 Good Faith and Estoppel 
In several European civil law countries, the concept of good faith, apparent mandate, and 
ostensible authority have sometimes been used to compel a party to arbitrate. Countries 
such as Finland and Sweden protect parties from breaches of good faith; thus, if a party has 
acted as if it is party to a contract, then it is party to a contract.  
                                                
79 Hanotiau Complex Arbitrations, p. 13. 
80 Townsend 2009,  p. 360. 
81 InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 2003 
82 Townsend 2009,  p. 360. 
83 InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 2003, at 143. 
  28 
The ICC has adopted a similar position in several cases; for example, in ICC case no. 2375 
of 1975, where the arbitral tribunal found that despite the wording of certain clauses of the 
contract, company B had made a deal with group A, rather than just one company of the 
group. Therefore, the arbitral tribunal found that it had jurisdiction over the companies of 
group A.84 Another good example case according to Hanotiau, is ICC case no. 5370 of 
1988, where the tribunal found it had jurisdiction over Mr. Z because, in the eyes of third 
parties, all the companies owned by Mr. Z form a group of companies dependent on Mr. Z 
and Mr. Z could not in good faith argue to the contrary.85 
On the other hand, common law countries often use estoppel in similar cases. In particular 
American courts often use estoppel to stop parties from claiming benefits of a contract 
without also submitting to its burdens by claiming to be a non-signatory. As with agency-
theory, estoppel is an American common law invention that can perhaps be summed up as 
the Fourt Circuit court in the International Paper case reasoned: 
”Equitable estoppel precludes a party from asserting rights ‘he otherwise would have had 
against another’ when his own conduct renders assertion of those rights contrary to 
equity. In the arbitration context, the doctrine recognizes that a party may be estopped 
from asserting that the lack of his signature on a written contract precludes enforcement of 
the contract's arbitration clause when he has consistently maintained that other provisions 
of the same contract should be enforced to benefit him”86 
Thus, there is a requirement that the party that is estopped from claiming to be a non-
signatory to have derived benefit from the contract containing the arbitration clause. The 
benefit does not have to be direct sale of goods. For example, in the Deloitte Noraudit A/S 
v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells U.S. case the use of a trade name was considered a benefit that 
bound the company to the arbitration clause even as a non-signing party. The courts 
decided that because Noraudit had failed to object to the agreement when it received it and 
accepted the benefits of said agreement it was a party to the agreement.87 
Hanotiau notes that a similar result would have occurred in a civil law court, but the legal 
theory would acceptance through subsequent conduct.88 He further argues that although 
estoppel is a useful theory, it has not been used in multi-contract, multi-party disputes in 
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cases where the law applied has been continental European civil law. The reason is that it 
is not part of civil law tradition.89 
4.2.5 Transfers 
The effects of universal or individual transfers, such as mergers, succession, subrogation90, 
transfer of contract, or transfer of debt may change the final parties to the arbitration 
clause. Thus, sometimes such transfers may result in multi-party arbitrations.  
It is generally agreed that when X transfers to Y a contract with Z containing an arbitration 
clause, it is Y not X that has the right to begin arbitration proceedings against Z, as a new 
party to the contract and arbitration clause therein.91 
4.2.6 Conduct 
A party that conducts its business as if it had consented to the arbitration agreement has 
implicitly consented to the agreement, under certain circumstances. As Hanotiau states, 
Tribunals often use conduct as a substitute for consent.92   
Consider the following example: A and B enter into an agreement containing an arbitration 
clause; subsequently, A sues B in court together with C, a non-signatory. But B and C 
invoke the existence of an arbitration clause to challenge the jurisdiction of the court, and 
the case is referred to an arbitral tribunal. The arbitral tribunal is justified in considering it 
has jurisdiction over C, because C has by conduct implied its consent to the arbitration 
agreement in court proceedings.93 
Conduct is a question of evidence. Courts and arbitral tribunals will only accept conduct as 
a sign of consent, if the involvement has been substantial, either as negotiation or 
performance of the agreement. This is an e contrario interpretation from -- for example -- 
ICC case no. 4972 of 1989, where the arbitrators concluded that the second defendant, part 
of the same group of companies, had not played a substantial enough part, so that one 
could deduce that the second defendant had ratified the agreement.94  
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The absolute requirement of a written agreement for arbitration may lead to problems, in 
jurisdictions such as Finland, where oral agreements are otherwise accepted. 95  The 
problems arise from a situation where parties have made an oral agreement containing the 
arbitration clause, because the rest of the agreement valid but the arbitration clause lacks 
validity. As Koulu states, there might be cases where the parties are bound by the main 
contract, but not the arbitration clause.96 Compare this to Sweden and Denmark, where 
both oral, and even silent acceptance, of an arbitration agreement may bind the parties, if 
there is sufficient evidence.97 However, as noted above in Finnish Supreme Court case 
KKO 2013:84, a third party could be bound to an agreement he had not signed but had 
benefitted from, and where the dispute was on a breach of said agreement and damages of 
the breach. 
Hanotiau notes that, the existence of a group of companies gives a special dimension to the 
issue of conduct or consent.98 It is a special case, which I will examine in the next part. 
4.2.7 Group of companies doctrine 
Group of companies doctrine originated in 1970s in France, and is one of the most 
prominent theories used in the extension of an arbitration agreement to non-signatories.99 
As we will see in this part, the group of companies doctrine is controversial and while it 
creates a presumption that the company might be bound it does not, by itself, bind 
companies of the same group to arbitration agreements made by other companies of the 
same group of companies. 
The interim award in the Dow Chemical case of 1982 is perhaps the most widely known 
statement of the group of companies doctrine. The arbitral tribunal stated that “the 
arbitration clause expressly accepted by certain companies of the group should bind the 
other companies which, by virtue of their role in the conclusion, performance, or 
termination of the contracts containing said clauses, and in accordance with the mutual 
intention of all parties to the proceedings, appear to have been veritable parties to these 
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contracts or to have been principally concerned by them and the disputes to which they 
may give rise”100 
The mere existence of the group companies is not in itself sufficient to permit the 
extension of an arbitration agreement to a non-signatory company of the group.101 This 
was already made clear in the Dow Chemical case itself.  Rather, it is more important to 
judge the conduct of the non-signatory party.  
According to Hanotiau, the group of companies doctrine has the following principles: 
firstly, the question of consent to arbitration may have a special dimension when one or 
several companies to a complex international transaction are members of a group of 
companies, given the nature of relationships between companies in such a group. 
Secondly, the consent to arbitrate may be implied from the conduct of a company of the 
group, even if they did not sign the relevant arbitration agreement. Rather, the companies’ 
conduct during the negotiation, performance, and termination of the agreement may be 
such that consent to arbitrate exists. 
Lastly, Hanotiau points out that simply being part of a group of companies where one or 
more of the companies have signed the agreement containing the arbitration clause does 
not in itself permit extension to such a company.102 The Swiss Federal Supreme Court 
doctrine states that a company can become bound to the same arbitration agreement as 
another company of the group if the general principles of Swiss law would lead to a 
binding of the affiliated company.103 
The group of companies doctrine has become unpopular within opinio iuris in later years 
because, as Hanotiau states, there is a risk that the formula will be used as a “shortcut 
permitting avoidance of rigorous legal reasoning” that would allow the extension of an 
arbitration clause to a company where its conduct and the circumstances of the case have 
not warranted such an extension.104 It is quite clear that Hanotiau views the group of 
companies doctrine as suboptimal legal reasoning for the extension of an arbitration clause 
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to a non-signatory. In Finland, the group of companies doctrine has no related case law. 
Piercing of the corporate veil is extremely rare.105 
4.2.8 Conclusions 
Clear rules on the extension of arbitration agreements to non-signatory parties are 
necessary, because effective dispute resolution in multi-party and multi-contract situations 
requires rules that bind connected parties to the process.  In complex arbitral proceedings 
with multiple parties, the question of consent is amplified: for example, can a guarantor 
that has not signed the original contract be joined into an arbitration process at its request. 
Thus, effective rules and principles that lead to predictable results are a necessity. 
There are problems with predictability, since most theories on consent are used in casu, 
rather than as part of a logical system. It would be beneficial for the international 
commercial arbitration community to develop a common framework for consent. 
As Hanotiau aptly noted, “one is sometimes tempted to wonder whether equity is not in 
some cases the paramount consideration, and all the legal theories that advance the final 
decision are ex post facto creations.”106 In the functional study chapter I will explore how 
these theories influence the rules and practices at international arbitration institutions. 
4.3 Enforcement 
A core requirement of the binding resolution of a dispute is that the decision actually binds 
the parties. Enforcement of a decision means recognition in the national courts of the 
parties home state, because national courts can compel action by a party. Enforcement and 
recognition of awards are a key requirement of international commercial arbitration: 
without them corporations would be subject to the whims of national courts, and 
arbitration would be meaningless.107 In this part I will examine the requirements for 
enforceability and recognition in accordance with the New York Convention. 
The core requirements for enforcement of arbitral awards are contained in the Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York 
Convention”) that entered into force in 1959. This convention is the reason for the close to 
universal enforceability of arbitral awards globally. It is key part of the global arbitration 
system. The New York Convention provides for uniform enforcement rules in more than 
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149 countries. Therefore, parties in international arbitrations can be reasonably sure that 
the arbitral award will be enforceable against the other party, wherever they may be 
located.  
The New York Convention provides for a flexible framework with regards to enforcement 
of arbitral awards, with few requirements that an awards must meet in order to be eligible 
for enforcement. According to Kurkela & Turunen, the Convention forms the core 
procedural rules of due process in international commercial arbitration.108  
The robust enforcement mechanism rests upon Article V and Article VII. Article V limits 
denial of recognition to only stated reasons in the Convention. Article VII allows parties to 
choose the most favorable regime for enforcement, whether that is the convention itself, 
another treaty, or local laws.109 This allows for better co-existence between national laws 
and international instruments.110 Thus, van den Berg and others have said, the New York 
Convention has a pro-enforcement bias, and that national courts shall interpret the grounds 
for refusal strictly. 111 
The robust enforcement mechanism ensures that very few cases actually require its 
usage.112 A survey from 2008 found, that users of arbitration reported that only 11 % of all 
cases required the usage of enforcement proceedings to collect awards. Less than 3 % of 
all cases had genuine problems with enforcement. Even then, the most prevalent problem 
was that the opposing party lacked assets (46% of the 3%) and an even smaller minority 
were related to problems with the New York Convention (6% of the 3%) or hostility to 
enforcement of foreign awards (17% of the 3%).113   
The requirements are laid out in articles II - VII in the convention. The principal grounds 
for non-recognition, according to Born, are: (a) lack of valid arbitration agreement or 
excess of jurisdiction; (b) procedural irregularities in the arbitration; (c) bias of the 
arbitral tribunal; (d) violation of public policy; (e) non-arbitrability; (f) lack of binding 
status of the award; and (g) annulment of the award in the arbitral seat. 114 I will now 
examine these grounds for non-recognition in depth. 
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4.3.1 Validity (a) 
A valid written arbitration agreement is required for enforcement, according to Article II 
(1) and (2) of the New York Convention, which states that states shall recognize an 
agreement in writing under which the parties agree to submit their dispute to arbitration, as 
long as it is a matter capable of being settled by arbitration. Agreements in writing may be 
a specific arbitration agreement or a clause in a contract. The validity of the award also 
requires that it be final and not subject to conditionals.115 
The question is one of valid consent, which is also raised by Article V(1)(a), which gives a 
party the right to challenge the validity of an arbitration agreement. According to Lew et 
al., Article V(1)(a) and Article II are linked by the question of consent.116 The award binds 
non-signatories that have consented, but this may lead to problems with recognition in 
some jurisdictions.117  
The valid arbitration agreement gives the arbitrators the mandate to settle the dispute as 
well as allow the parties to exclude the application of certain laws and regulations.118 There 
are limitations with regards to public policy, arbitrability, and reasonableness. Arbitrators 
must respect the boundaries set by the parties, because there is no jurisdiction except that 
which is given in the agreement to arbitrate. 119 
The requirement of a valid written arbitration agreement has led to problems with regards 
to non-signatories in multi-party and multi-contract situations. The New York Convention 
in its current form is not well suited for enforcement of awards with non-signatories, 
because of the requirements of Article II. However, the ‘most favored rule principle’ often 
ensures enforceability in such circumstances, because other treaties or local laws can 
provide for enforcement and recognition. An unanswered question that has potential to be 
a problem can be illustrated with the following example: Sweden which is very liberal on 
the question of consent, as the Swedish Arbitration Act does not require a written contract; 
120therefore an arbitration with its seat in Sweden might run into problems in a state like 
Germany, where the written arbitration agreement requirement is much more strict.  
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4.3.2 Losers’ rights (b-c) 
The first paragraph of Article V lists the grounds for refusal of enforcement that must be 
proven by the respondent. These are often called the “loser’s rights to a fair arbitration”121, 
because they grant national courts the discretion to reject or annul an award with 
procedural irregularities. Such cases can arise if the arbitrators have set aside requirements 
of the audi alteram partem principle, or the right to present one’s case.  
Article V(1)(a) also extends to situations where parties cannot in advance waive their 
rights to national courts. In the United States, for example, contracts between businesses 
and consumers often include arbitration clauses; however, this is not possible in countries 
of the European Union, where the consumer protection regulations state that, consumers 
are not bound by arbitration agreements agreed to before the dispute arose. 
Kurkela & Turunen also state that when the situation is ultra petita or beyond the scope of 
the agreement, the recognition and enforcement may be refused according to Article 
V(1)(c).122  
According to Born, article V(1)(d) means that if the parties have agreed or consented, 
either in explicitly or implicitly, that consolidation or joinder are allowed, then the award 
can be enforced under the convention.123 Thus, if consolidation is based on the parties 
consent, then the convention does not provide any grounds for denying the recognition of 
an award. Therefore, the question of how far the rules of the arbitration institutions stretch 
this consent is important. 
4.3.3 Public policy and arbitrability (d-e) 
Public policy is a reason for refusing enforcement according to Article V (2)(b). This 
means awards, which are contrary to public policy of forum country may be refused 
enforcement.124 This means a competent national authority, i.e. a court, may refuse 
enforcement irrespective of whether parties or the arbitral panel raised issues of public 
policy.125 It may also be referred to as the public policy exception or ordré public. 
Fundamental principles of justice, morality, essential norms, and international obligations 
form the core of non-recognition on grounds of public policy. Courts apply public policy 
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exceptions ex officio, regardless of parties’ acts or omissions. Thus a failure raise grounds 
for a public policy exception during arbitral proceedings does not bar their usage in 
recognition proceedings, according to Kurkela & Turunen.126 
The European Court of Human Rights (the “ECHR”) has on several occasions stated that 
the very essence of due process rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human 
Rights cannot be waived in the course of arbitral proceedings, and this is grounds for 
quashing awards.127 Kurkela & Turunen have noted, that essential norms or mandatory 
public policy should bar recognition and enforcement only when (a) the scope of the rule is 
intended to encompass the situation at hand; or (b) the recognition or enforcement would 
clearly disrupt vital, political, social, or economic interests protected by the rule. The 
violations should furthermore be essential rather than minor.128 
Arbitrations must concern matters that are capable of settlement through arbitration. 
Article V(2)(a) of the New York Convention allows competent national authorities to 
refuse recognition of an award on a subject matter that is not capable of settlement through 
arbitration. There are several types of disputes where arbitrability differs between 
signatory states. Unlike the United States, the European Union states forbid mandatory 
arbitration agreements in advance between companies and consumers. There has been 
some discussion on competition policies in the European Union and whether breaches of 
these policies could be subject to arbitration; 129 however, the general consensus is that 
they cannot be subject to arbitration, as it is a question of jurisdiction. Indispositive issues 
cannot be arbitrated, because in such cases, the parties cannot cede the jurisdiction of 
national courts to the arbitration tribunal. 
The effectiveness of arbitration as a means of resolving disputes is fundamentally tied to 
the possibility of enforcing those awards against the loser in a foreign jurisdiction. 
Arbitration is pointless without enforceability. 
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4.4 Due process 
The core due process requirements in arbitration come from Article V of the New York 
Convention, which allows parties to raise objections in front of a national court if there 
have been grave procedural irregularities in the arbitration process. The courts may then 
refuse recognition or annul the award.   
The core of due process are principles of neutrality and equality-at-arms. In this subchapter 
I will expand upon these fundamental due process requirements in the context of multi-
party arbitration.  
Neutrality is always at the top of reasons for choosing arbitration to international 
litigation.130 International arbitration is chosen, because it allows parties to choose neutral 
rules and a neutral place for the adjudication of disputes, and certainty that awarsd can be 
enforced.131 Neutrality is a negative right and equality-at-arms, as we will see, is a positive 
right of parties. 
I will first deal with the neutrality of the forum; thereafter the arbitrators; and finally the 
process itself. 
4.4.1 Forum 
Parties to international contracts come from different countries and legal systems. 
Therefore, they want to submit their disputes to a neutral third party for adjudication, 
rather than a foreign court with unfamiliar rules, language and laws. National rules have 
not been created with international commerce in mind, whereas international commercial 
arbitration exists to serve the needs of international commerce. 
A dispute concerning an international agreement without an arbitration clause may find 
parties having to commence proceedings at a foreign court, employ unfamiliar lawyers, 
translate documents, and use resources and time in a system they do not properly 
understand.132 Parties also fear local judges’ predisposition to finding for the local party. 
Arbitration clauses in international commerce can be analogous to an insurance policy. 
Should a dispute arise, both parties can be reasonably sure that they are not unfairly 
disadvantaged. Parties can rarely escape all local laws, because both the rules of the seat 
(lex arbitri) and the due process guarantees play a role in the procedural rules, as well as in 
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the proceedings to have awards annulled or recognition refused. So parties may still find 
themselves in the jurisdiction of a foreign court, trapped within  a foreign legal system.  
Parties should pay attention to the rules of the arbitration institution and seat of arbitration, 
especially when concerned with multi-party and multi-contract arbitration agreements, 
since the rules vary considerably at this time. 
4.4.2 Arbitrators 
Selecting ones’ own arbitrator is a core right of arbitration. Multi-party arbitration 
situations limit this right to safeguard neutrality and equality-at-arms. Parties can agree 
upon the number and selection of arbitrators’ freely in the arbitration agreement. The most 
common number of arbitrators is either one or three, which is stipulated by almost all 
arbitration institution rules. 
The appointment of arbitrators was considered a difficult issue with regards to multi-party 
arbitration proceedings.133 The reasons can be found in the famous DUTCO case and the 
decision of the French Court of Cassation in 1992  
The DUTCO case was an arbitration process regarding the construction of a cement 
factory. The construction agreement contained an ICC arbitration clause with a three-
member arbitral tribunal. Dutco initiated the arbitration against BKMI and Siemens. The 
ICC Court asked BKMI and Siemens to jointly nominate an arbitrator, which they did 
under protest. The arbitral tribunal ruled that it had jurisdiction, and a lower court in Paris 
confirmed this decision. However, the French Court of Cassation held that a joint 
appointment violated Siemens’ and BKMI’s right to equal treatment, overturned the 
decision on the basis that the right to equal treatment was part of public policy. This meant 
that the right of each party to appoint its arbitrator could not be waived in advance.134 
The ICC was the first institute to provide for a mechanism whereby the parties to each side 
were bound to agree on an arbitrator. If they failed to do so, the institution would appoint 
all the arbitrators. The rationale behind these rules is obvious: if the institution appoints all 
the arbitrators of a tribunal, then all parties have been treated equally. 135  Other 
international arbitration institutions followed the ICC’s lead and enacted similar rules.136  
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Born argues, that the selection of all arbitrators by the neutral appointing authority does the 
least violence to the principles of equal treatment of parties.137 However, as Voser et al., 
point out, this requires an assumption that the French court went too far in the DUTCO 
case by calling it a public policy issue and that institutional rules, which amount to an 
advanced waiver, are valid.138 
Arbitration institutions have chosen slightly different extents to which their rules expand 
party consent on the matter of appointment of arbitrators in multi-party situations. The 
ICC, FAI, Swiss, and HKIAC rules all state that the institute may appoint all the arbitrators 
if parties are unable to agree upon the selection of arbitrators. 139  This leaves the 
appointment at the discretion of the arbitral institute. Other arbitration institutions have 
adopted a stricter approach: the SCC, ICDR, CEPANI, and LCIA arbitration institution 
rules all state that in a situation where parties are unable to agree upon the selection of 
arbitrators, the institute shall appoint all the arbitrators.140 In Finland the courts can appoint 
arbitrators if the parties are unwilling or unable to reach an agreement on the arbitrators.141  
  ICC FAI Swiss HKIAC SCC ICDR CEPANI LCIA 
Appointment of 
Arbitrators May May May May Shall Shall Shall Shall 
Table 1: Appointment of arbitrators (Source: Author) 
The ICC Court has in the past confirmed the claimants’ appointment and only appointed a 
co-arbitrator for the respondents, rather than appointing all of the arbitrators. The ICC first 
puts parties on notice that it may resort to appointing the arbitrators unless parties can 
agree, which often leads to parties agreeing on an arbitrator.142 It is clear that the ICC has 
on occasion used the flexibility of its rules to appoint only one party’s arbitrator. 
Voser et al. recommend that arbitration institutions open their policies and broaden their 
acceptance of multi-polar arbitrations, and allow for the appointment of more than three 
arbitrators if necessary.143 
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The right to select one’s arbitrator is important, and removing that right, even if it is 
necessary, is a disadvantage for multi-party arbitration proceedings. The arbitration 
institutions should expand their rules to allow for more input by the parties in the process 
of the selection of arbitrators. The perceived quality of the arbitration is directly related to 
quality of the arbitrators. 
4.4.3 Procedural guarantees 
The due process rights of the parties must be guaranteed throughout the arbitration process 
otherwise the award will not be final. Most exceptions to the finality of the arbitral award 
are based on basic procedural guarantees not being respected. 144 
The essences of the due process requirement is the audi alteram partem maxim, which 
means that each party shall have be given the possibility to present its’ case from its’ own 
point of view and bring all the relevant evidence in support of its’ position before an 
impartial arbitrator, who leads the process.145  
Multi-party proceedings are not exempt from procedural guarantees, although such 
proceedings may place more demands on the arbitrators, the basic demands of due process 
must be met: parties must have an opportunity to make submissions, and comment on the 
submissions of other parties. Inadequate opportunities to present ones’ case may lead to 
annulment of awards.146 The parties’ core rights of due process are not waivable.147  
“In managing the procedure, the key element is the equal treatment of the parties, which is 
a due process requirement and part of lex proceduralia. The tribunal has to make certain 
that it does not act in a way that would result in an objective impression of bias whether or 
not the tribunal was actually biased. In addition, all the parties have to be given an equal 
and sufficient opportunity to present their case. Finally, the tribunal should work toward a 
correct result.”148 It is important to make sure parties’ submissions are distributed to all 
parties involved effectively and without delay.149 
I will now expand upon the most prevalent recurring categories of procedural unfairness 
claims: Introducing a new claim at the last minute without affording the counter-party an 
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adequate opportunity to respond is a basis for annulling the award. However, arbitrators 
are allowed substantial discretion.150 Insititutional rules, or agreement by the parties, may 
limit this discretion.151 
Equality of treatment means that each party must be given an opportunity to present its 
case. For example, if an arbitral tribunal only presents one of the parties with the 
opportunity to address an issue, submit evidence, or otherwise present its case, then the 
case is subject to annulment.152 The guarantees are not exact and tribunals are afforded 
considerable discretion.  
Failure to permit a party to present its arguments or evidence is a fundamental procedural 
guarantee in arbitration, and recognized by most legal systems. In Finland § 22 of the FAA 
states “the arbitral tribunal shall give the parties a sufficient opportunity to present their 
case”. This is the principle of equality-of-arms, meaning the right to examine opponents’ 
submissions, make observation upon them, and refute them with the parties’ own 
submission and offers of evidence. The discretion given the tribunal on matters of evidence 
is broad, and makes annulment on this ground very unlikely.153 
The refusal to hold a hearing (specifically, an oral hearing) at the request of one of the 
parties can be a denial of that party's opportunity to be heard.. However, the arbitrators are 
allowed significant leeway in determining the need for hearings on issues that arise in 
arbitration.154  
According to Born, parties sometimes seek to annul arbitral awards on the grounds of 
scheduling decisions by the arbitral tribunal that negated their right to present their case, by 
(for instance) preventing the attendance of a witness, granting less preparation time than 
requested, or providing the opponent more time to respond.155 The tribunals generally have 
a lot of discretion, but if the tribunal grants a significant and unjustified advantage to one 
party, then the award is vulnerable to annulment. 
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Procedural objections can be waived in some circumstances. Many institutional rules state 
that, unless parties raise procedural objections promptly, they are deemed to have waived 
the right to do so.156 
Multi-party situations require more attention to be paid to the arbitration process. 
Specifically the equal treatment of parties requires more organized process leadership. 
Submissions and comments by parties must be directed properly, so that all parties can 
comment on all the other parties’ submissions.  Ensuring that parties are able to present 
their cases in a complete manner, but still keeping the process from becoming too time 
consuming. Kurkela & Turunen remark, that it is very important to put all parties on notice 
and give them reasonable opportunity to present their views, defenses, or claims in multi-
party situations.157 
4.4.4 Lis pendens and res judicata 
Arbitral tribunals, and courts, decisions are subject to rules of preclusion. A court shall not 
examine a case that concerns a dispute with a valid arbitration agreement.158 The inverse is 
also true and the rules of preclusion are part of the applicable law, which arbitral tribunals 
must apply. Basic preclusion rules are part of public policy in most countries. Courts in 
Switzerland, the United States, France, Sweden, and others have annulled awards due to 
preclusion.159 In Finland the FAA does not contain any specific rules on the subject of 
preclusion, but general procedural rules apply, and arbitrators must examine such claims, if 
made by parties.160 
There are two main rules of preclusion that are part of public policy: 1) finally settled 
disputes cannot be refought in a different forum, this is often called ‘res judicata’; 2) if a 
dispute has been raised in one competent forum it cannot be raised at the same time in 
another forum, this is called ‘lis pendens’. 
If two parties have commenced arbitration on the same matter, the one that was 
commenced first has a lis pendens effect on the second. The situation is more complicated 
when there is a court case and an arbitration case pending on the same matter. Lindskog 
states that the existence of a court case should not hinder the commencement of arbitration, 
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by itself.161 A court case on the existence of, or consent to, an arbitration agreement should 
have a strong preclusion effect.162 Should a competent court decide there is no agreement 
or consent, the arbitrators will lack jurisdiction and any arbitral award will be 
unenforceable, according to Born.163 It is unclear, whether arbitral tribunals are obliged to 
examine lis pendens ex officio. Lindskog argues, that they should only examine lis pendens 
or res judicata, if a party raises such a claim.164 
However, the strength of preclusion rules are muddled when dealing with matters, such as 
the scope of an agreement, termination, or waivers. If an arbitral tribunal concludes that a 
prior jurisdictional decision is incorrect, or rests on non-arbitrability, or public policy, the 
tribunal may properly reach a different conclusion, according to Born.165 In provisional 
measures the res judicata effect should be strong and parties should not be permitted to 
seek the same measures multiple times.166  
Arbitral tribunals have developed their own sui generis international preclusion principles, 
according to which, the binding effect of the first award is inclusive the contents and 
extends to the legal reasons for the award, i.e. the ratio decidendi.167 However, res judicata 
is often given a much narrower scope in arbitration proceedings, binding only the two 
exact parties in this exact dispute. In multi-party and multi-contract situations this may 
lead to problems with conflicting decisions, between arbitral tribunals in the same 
economic transaction or legal relationship. If the arbitral tribunal, against the wishes of any 
party, reconsiders an issue that has been competently decided by court or arbitral tribunal, 
the award may be subject to an annulment claim.168 
Lis pendens is not readily applied to international arbitration, because it rests on the 
presumption that there are two competent forums to which a dispute may be referred. 
Rather international arbitration contends that the only competent forum is the one 
mentioned in the arbitration clause. However, jurisdictional objections to national courts 
should have a lis pendens effect on the arbitral tribunal.169 Lindskog aptly notes, that there 
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may be significant issues of what preclusion effect a ruling in a foreign court, which may 
or may not be recognized, should have on an arbitration process in another country.170 
The same dispute between, two same or effectively same, parties that is pending at 
different arbitral tribunals under the same institute gives rise to lis pendens. An example of 
such a case is where two bilateral investment treaty tribunals considered almost identical 
claims for expropriation against the same state respondent by an individual entrepreneur 
and an investment vehicle. One of the tribunals was requested to suspend proceedings 
pending an award in the other, on the grounds of lis pendens. The request was denied, 
because the treaty does not deprive one claimant of jurisdiction if it is granted another 
under the treaty.171 Lis pendens should be applicable in multi-party proceedings, since it 
would increase legal certainty and decrease conflicting decisions.  
Right now parties may strategically plan to use the possibilities that lack of preclusion 
rules presents them, by trying essentially the same dispute several times, until they find a 
tribunal that decides in a favorable way.  This so-called “multi-shot” arbitration should be 
discouraged. 
As we have seen in this subchapter, a just process is the best guarantee for valid awards. In 
the following subchapter, I will deal with speed and efficiency of the arbitral process. 
4.5 Efficiency 
It is regarded as common knowledge that arbitration is faster and more efficient than 
international litigation. This perception of efficiency exists because arbitrators can start 
work immediately172, and the decision is final and binding, with no right of appeal.173  This 
efficiency principal is a reason why arbitration is often chosen as a means to resolve 
disputes.174 
However, recent developments have lead some to conclude that international commercial 
arbitration can no longer be characterized as ‘fast’, because typical disputes take between 
18 to 36 months to resolve. Interestingly, the FAI states that the average times to resolve a 
dispute in Finland is 9 months.175 
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Increasing the complexity of the arbitration increases the time required for its resolution. 
This leads to an interesting question with regards to complex arbitrations -- namely, 
whether a complex processes with more parties is in aggregate, more efficient than several 
simpler proceedings. The answer will vary according to the situation and should be 
considered in casu. Multiple parties in an arbitration means there is more work for each 
party, and the arbitrators, because submissions, comments on others submissions, hearings, 
and submitting evidence take significantly longer.  
Smaller parties are therefore less likely to accept consolidation into a larger dispute, 
because the whole dispute will likely take longer to resolve, than the smaller party’s simple 
case. Larger parties may also decline consolidation, because they view their position as 
tenuous and prefer to have a multi-shot situation, where they perceive themselves as able 
to win at least some of the cases. 
Parties strategic behavior in these circumstances, which is in their self-interest, is 
detrimental to the efficiency of international commercial arbitration as a whole, in cases 
where the aggregated case, would be more efficient than several parallel or serial cases. 
4.6 Cost-effectiveness 
Earlier arbitration was universally perceived as cost-effective for users. Recent surveys 
show that corporations no longer consider cost-effectiveness a feature of arbitration (over 
50% of respondents in a 2006 survey answered that cost-effectiveness is not a feature of 
arbitration).176 Cost-effectiveness is directly related to the legal costs of arbitration users. 
International commercial arbitration is an expensive process, because parties are required 
to pay the arbitral institution and arbitrators, in addition to, their own legal costs, as well as 
logistical expenses, which can amount to substantial costs for all involved parties. Moses 
further argues that, as the stakes have grown in international commercial arbitration so 
have the parties begun using litigation tactics, which tend to raise costs, create delays, and 
increase the adversarial nature of the process.177 Born argues, that arbitration is more 
expensive than litigation in many cases.178 Most of the costs of arbitration are related to 
legal expenses of parties, rather than fees of institutes or arbitrators. This requires being 
mindful of procedural bloat, which occurs when processes become too big to be handled 
properly. 
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The other advantages -- including lack of appellate courts, procedural disputes, and legal 
uncertainty regarding enforceability -- are still significant enough to make arbitration 
appealing.179  Users of arbitration would welcome developments, which would make 
arbitration cheaper for the users. Multi-party arbitration mechanisms may be able to 
enhance the cost-effective resolution of certain types of disputes. 
4.7 Conclusions 
Applying the general principles of international commercial arbitration to multi-party and 
multi-contract proceedings is necessary, but not straightforward. Mechanisms allowing for 
consolidation, and third party participation may be necessary for fair, efficient, and 
economical commercial justice. Increased procedural efficiency and cost effectiveness 
must not come at the cost of parties rights of due process, meaning neutrality and equality. 
To summarize, increasing effectiveness of complex arbitration proceedings must be 
mindful of fairness above all else. Without fairness there can be no effective arbitration. 
Fairness means that all core due process requirements are respected for all parties 
involved. Arbitral institutions must ensure that parties are dealt with in a neutral and equal 
manner when appointing arbitrators. Arbitrators must keep within their jurisdiction and 
allow each party to present its’ case.  Multi-party and multi-contract mechanisms should 
not hinder fairness, but rather enhance legal certainty, for example, in cases where parties 
have multiple disputes; the same arbitrators should adjudicate them all. 
Efficient international commercial arbitration safeguards enforcement and recognition 
foremost, and within reason endeavors to increase the efficiency of the process. Increasing 
efficiency in multi-party and multi-contract situations by bringing all relevant parties into 
the same process, when aggregate efficiency requires, as long as there is consent. Ensuring 
that parties have consented to the arbitration agreement is very important in cases where 
there are non-signatories involved. The arbitral institutions should also endeavor to begin 
arbitration as soon as possible, by nominating and confirming arbitrators within a 
reasonable time. 
Ensuring fairness and promoting efficiency safeguards cost effectiveness, because the 
costliest proceeding is one that leads to no results, i.e. the award is annulled or not 
recognized. That being said any action that arbitrators or arbitral institutions can undertake 
to minimize procedural bloat and empty time periods should be taken. In multi-party and 
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multi-contract cases this means that arbitrators should draw up a plan for the process as 
well as fix submission, and comment timetables as soon as possible. 
It is also important to take note of the problems related to res judicata, and lis pendens in 
multi-party and multi-contract situations, because parallel proceedings and inconsistent 
verdicts can be a problem, due to the way arbitral institutes interpret them. Institutions 
must be at the forefront, because parties strategic interest when the dispute has commenced 
is not beneficial for arbitration as a whole. 
The next chapter will study the multi-party mechanisms at international arbitration 
institutions in the context of the principles developed in this chapter. 
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5 Study on multi-party mechanisms 
5.1 Introduction 
“From a broader perspective, many cases reveal that consolidation or joinder may be the 
only adequate means of achieving the ultimate goals of arbitration: fair, efficient, and 
economical commercial justice.” -Thomas Stipanovic.180 
The aim of this chapter is to examine, systematize, and compare, in a global perspective, 
the multi-party rules enacted by the five studied arbitration institutions. The rules studied 
are those dealing with consolidation, joinder, and intervention. For the purpose of this 
study I will assume that the lex arbitri or seat of arbitration is the same as the home 
country of the institution. The rules which create multi-party mechanisms differ in scope, 
theoretical background, and effects. 
The rules of arbitral institutions create mechanisms that can be employed in specific 
circumstances. The arbitral institutions surveyed are the ICC, FAI, HKIAC, SCC, and 
SCCAM. Although the rules are similar there are key differences between the mechanisms 
created. This chapter will showcase some of the key differences and similarities of the 
rules at the studied arbitral institutions, and attempt to assess whether they enhance. I will 
also critically analyze the mechanisms chosen. 
There are two distinct writing techniques employed at the surveyed arbitration institutions: 
first, the ICC, FAI and HKIAC write exact and in-depth rules, which aim to give a high 
legal certainty to readers of the rules, meaning that it is easier to know the effects of the 
rules in advance. The second, used at the SCC and SCCAM is generalist, which means a 
preference of open clauses that give the institution and arbitrators more flexibility to 
interpret the exact contents of the rules on the basis of the situation at hand. 
The chapter is divided into two parts: the first, deals with joinder and intervention, and the 
second part deals with consolidation. In both parts the ICC rules are explained first and 
used as a reference point, and then compared to the other institutes rules. The ICC Rules 
changed substantially on 1.1.2012 to include, among others, multi-party procedural rules 
on joinder, and consolidation. The new rules are a result of many years of revision and 
planning.181  The ICC's rules are used as a benchmark against which other institutions' 
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rules will be compared, because the ICC is the oldest and most popular international 
arbitration institute. The analysis is functional in nature and based upon the rules 
themselves and other available material, such as handbooks and guides by the institutes, or 
parties close to the institutes. 
5.2 Joinder and intervention 
Joinder is simply a request for arbitration, containing a claim against a new party that 
should be added to an arbitration that is already in progress, by an existing party to that 
arbitration process. Intervention is a request for arbitration by a third party wishing to be 
added as a claimant into an existing arbitration process. Both requests for arbitration are 
received by the secretariat of the arbitral institution and subject to the requirements set 
forth in the institutes rules either accepted or declined. 
The rules that create the mechanisms of joinder and intervention are largely inspired by 
procedural rules for courts in most countries. National courts almost always have the 
ability to join additional claimants or defendants to cases, if their claims are compatible 
and procedural efficiency is enhanced. In Finland, for instance, the procedural law allows 
similar claims between connected parties, and even other claims or parties (if deemed 
appropriate for the solution of all claims) to be joined.182 Other countries have similar 
procedural rules. The joinder and intervention mechanisms are transplants of this 
mechanism to international commercial arbitration. 
The general procedure for joinder and intervention is as follows: a party that wishes a third 
party joined or a party that wishes to join an arbitration in progress submits a request for 
arbitration to the institution that has a specific format. These are called either request for 
joinder or request for intervention. Thereafter, the institution examines the request and 
allows the new party to enter the arbitration in progress, if it fulfills the requirements set 
forth in the institutions rules. The request requires certain information, such as 
identification of the case already in progress, a copy of the arbitration agreement, contact 
details, etc.183  
                                                
182 The Finnish Procedural Law 18:1-7 
183 See for example Article 10.4 of the  FAI Rules; Articles 7(2) and 4 (3) c,d,e,f of the ICC Rules; Article 
27.4 of the HKIAC Rules; The request for joinder should contain the following information: 1) Identification 
of the existing case e.g. case number; 2) The names and contact details of the parties, including the additional 
party;  3) Identification and where possible a copy of the arbitration agreement under which the dispute is to 
be settled; 4) Identification of any contract, other legal instrument or relationship from where the dispute 
against the additional party arises; 5) a description of the nature and circumstances of the dispute giving rise 
to the claims against this additional party; 6) Where claims are made under more than one arbitration 
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If the request for joinder or the request for intervention is accepted, then the arbitral 
institute must revoke possible nominations of arbitrators and nominate new ones, unless all 
parties consent to already-nominated arbitrators. This means that arbitral institutes have 
implemented strict timing for these requests, since institutes will not revoke nominations of 
arbitrators, unless it is absolutely necessary. The ICC, for example, limits requests for 
joinder to before the case has been transmitted to the arbitral panel for this reason. 
The chief difference between joinder and intervention is information availability. In 
joinder, a party already privy to all the information of the case requests for a new party to 
be added. In intervention, the third party must have learnt of the arbitration in progress and 
wish to join. Therefore, in practice, intervention requests are made by third parties close to 
the original parties.  
Joinder and intervention help to lessen the problems of lis pendens and res judicata, since 
they allow for all parties to be involved in the same process, rather than leading to parallel 
processes. 
5.2.1 Typical cases 
A typical joinder or intervention dispute is a dispute regarding a joint-venture agreement, 
where A, B, and C are all party to the same agreement, which contains an arbitration 
clause. If one party brings a claim against another in this type of contractual system, it may 
be expedient to bring the third party into the same procedure. The parties have all 
consented to the same arbitration agreement, therefore they can be deemed to have 
consented to having all their claims dealt with in a single proceeding if the arbitration 
clause is compatible. 
Another typical case for joinder is as follows: A contracts with B, and on the same day 
separately with B's parent company C, which issues a guarantee for B's obligations towards 
A. If all contracts contain compatible arbitration clauses, then if A sues B and B denies 
responsibility, A will seek to have C joined into the proceeding. The arbitral tribunal must 
determine whether it has jurisdiction, and -- if so -- whether C should be joined, because of  
procedural efficiency and lis pendens. 
                                                                                                                                              
agreement identification of the arbitration agreement under which each claim is made; 7) a preliminary 
statement of relief sought against the additional party, together with the amounts of any quantified claims, 
and if possible estimate of monetary value of the claims; and 8) Proof of payment of any filing fees. 
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A typical example case of intervention being required is if A, B, and C are co-owners of 
company D, whose bylaws contain an arbitration clause. If a dispute arises between A and 
B regarding the company, and the dispute is to be settled through arbitration, then the 
company D and/or co-owner C will both become aware of the arbitration in progress, and 
may have grounds to intervene to protect their interests. 
5.2.2 Study of rules and practices 
I will begin with mechanisms that allow for joinder, and thereafter deal with mechanisms 
that allow for intervention. All of the institutes have mechanisms in place for joinder. The 
Article 7 (1) of the ICC Rules states that a party wishing to join an additional party shall 
submit its request for arbitration against the additional party to the secretariat. The date 
when the request is received is the date that the arbitration has commenced against the 
additional party. This means that lis pendens effects also begin the day the request is 
received by the secretariat. This is interesting, because parties to be joined might not have 
been informed of this request until later. Joinder requests are also subject to the same 
provisions as normal arbitration requests.184 
The ICC has simplified its joinder request process, so that it is identical with a normal 
arbitration request. This means that parties are on equal footing, since the rules no longer 
make distinctions between claimants and respondents requesting third-party joinders. The 
secretariat may fix a time limit for the submission of joinder requests. No additional parties 
may be joined after the confirmation or appointment of any arbitrator, unless all parties, 
including the party to be joined, otherwise agree.185 Any one or several parties to 
arbitration may request a joinder of an additional party.186 
Article 10.1 of the FAI rules allows parties to pending arbitrations, wishing to join 
additional parties to the arbitration, to submit a request for arbitration against the additional 
party to the secretariat. This is identical with the ICC Rules.  
The FAI rules imposes a strict time limit for joinder requests by mandating that such 
requests, shall at latest be submitted to the institute before the transmission of the case file 
to the arbitral tribunal.187 Failure to comply with this strict deadline will result in dismissal 
of the request for joinder, unless all the parties to the arbitration, including the additional 
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party, agree to the joinder and accept the confirmed arbitrators. In comparison with the 
ICC Rules, the FAI would allow joinder after nomination of arbitrators, but before the 
transmission of the case file, meaning at a later time. In practice, a request for joinder is 
unlikely to succeed after any arbitrator has been nominated, because rescinding such a 
nomination is a significant measure, which the secretariat is unlikely to consider unless 
there are exceptional circumstances.188  
The FAI secretariat considers that parties to the same contract have consented to a single 
proceeding if that contract contains an FAI arbitration clause. This means that additional 
parties to the same contract can often be joined into the same proceeding. However, there 
are limitations regarding vertical contractual relationships, in which Savola notes that 
parties cannot be deemed to have consented in advance to having all disputes handled in 
one proceeding.189 An example of such a case is as follows: owner A sues main contractor 
B of a building project, and B seeks to join subcontractor C to the proceeding. The joinder 
request will be denied, because although they are both part of the same economic 
transaction, the legal relationship is distinctly different. Unless, there is explicit or implicit 
consent, either through the actions of the owner, or if the owner has signed the sub-
contractor agreement, then C cannot be joined into the arbitration. An example of a 
permissible joinder request is a case where A and B have entered into an agreement 
containing an arbitration clause, and B and bank C have on the same day signed a separate 
guarantee agreement relating to the main contract and containing a compatible arbitration 
clause.190 In comparison, the ICC Rules would likely lead to the same result; however, the 
Swiss Rules might lead to a very different result. 
The HKIAC Rules gives the tribunal power to allow additional parties to be joined to the 
arbitration in progress, if they are bound by an arbitration agreement under the HKIAC 
rules.191 Furthermore, the tribunal has the power to decide on any question of its own 
jurisdiction. 192  The HKIAC allows both joinder and intervention. This is the main 
difference between the ICC and HKIAC rules. 
Requests for arbitration against additional parties shall be submitted to the HKIAC. The 
time limit imposed by the HKIAC Rules is the confirmation of the arbitral tribunal; if a 
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third party is joined into an arbitration in progress all parties will be deemed to have 
waived their right to designate an arbitrator, and appointments can be revoked. In such 
circumstances, the HKIAC shall appoint the arbitral tribunal. There are several key 
differences between the HKIAC rules and ICC rules regarding timing and arbitrator 
selection. The HKIAC Rules do not see revocation of an appointment as an extreme 
measure to be used only in exceptional circumstances; thus, in practice, the timing of 
requests for third party participation to the HKIAC is less crucial. However, it must happen 
before the arbitral panel is confirmed and the case is transmitted. Joinder and intervention 
can be allowed after the panel has been confirmed if all parties unanimously consent to 
such a measure.  
Article 4(2) of the Swiss Rules state that, where one or more third persons request to 
participate in arbitral proceedings already pending under these Rules, or where a party to 
pending arbitral proceedings under these Rules requests that one or more third persons 
participate in the arbitration, the arbitral tribunal shall decide on such request, after 
consulting with all of the parties, including the person or persons to be joined, taking into 
account all relevant circumstances. The contrast between the ICC and Swiss Rules is stark, 
because they are written in a completely different way. I will now explain some of the key 
differences. 
The Swiss Rules use the word ‘person’, instead of ‘party’, because the rules make no 
distinction on whether an entity is a party when their entry into the arbitration is requested. 
It may even be the case that they will never become party to the arbitration, even if a 
request has been submitted and approved. The Swiss Rules are not a binary system, but 
rather accept different types of participation. Commentators contend that this wording is 
meant to allow for “side interventions”, such as amicus curiae briefs.193  The Swiss Rules 
intend to cover a full spectrum of potential third-person participation. This is clear, because 
persons need not be joined as parties nor do they necessarily need to be part of an 
arbitration agreement to participate.194 Commentators have also noted that selecting the 
Swiss Rules in an arbitration clause means giving consent to a wide variety of third-person 
participation in the arbitration proceedings.195  
                                                
193 Habegger 2012, p. 278. 
194 ibid p. 279. 
195 ibid p. 279;Voser & Schellenberg 2009,p. 395. 
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As Voser notes, joining of third parties without existing parties’ consent should happen 
only if “the balance between the party refusing and the party requesting joinder is clearly 
in favor of the requesting party”. The rules intend to grant the arbitral tribunal maximum 
flexibility when deciding on joinder requests by parties or third persons.196 
In comparison, the ICC Rules and secretariat’s guide unequivocally states: “Secretariat is 
not even in a position to acknowledge the existence of an arbitration, much less entertain a 
request for intervention”197 The ICC and Swiss Rules strike a different balance between 
confidentiality of the parties and efficiency of the process: the ICC stands on the side of 
confidentiality at the cost of efficiency, whereas the Swiss Rules give arbitral tribunals 
more possibilities to enhance efficiency and legal certainty, but may infringe on 
confidentiality of the parties. 
The SCC Rules contain no specific rules on joinder and intervention. However, Lindskog 
maintains that subject to the consent of all the parties, a third person may enter into the 
arbitration proceedings. This consent may be given in advance as part of the arbitration 
agreement, or during the arbitration process.198 Thus, it follows that with unanimous 
consent, a third person may join the arbitration process in Sweden. The SCC Rules do not 
contain specific consent to multi-party arbitration mechanisms; therefore only unanimous 
consent of all parties allows joinder or intervention. The difference between all other 
surveyed institutes is stark, because they have all adopted rules that expand parties’ 
consent in these matters. 
Other institutes such as the LCIA and CEPANI also have rules on joinder, but they are not 
part of this examination. However, article 22.1 of the LCIA Rules is interesting, because it 
allows the Arbitral Tribunal the power, by application or on its own, to allow third parties 
to be joined in the arbitration. The interesting part is that the LCIA does not require a 
compatible arbitration agreement, or an agreement between all parties; it is enough that an 
agreement exists between the party requesting joinder and the new party. This provision is 
one of the most disputed in the LCIA Rules.199  
To summarize joinder is less controversial and is permitted at most institutions until the 
arbitrators are confirmed, or the case is transmitted to the arbitral tribunal. Thus, timing is 
key for parties wishing to have third parties joined into an arbitration in progress. The 
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earlier the request is made, the more likely it is to succeed at all the examined institutes. 
Institutes are unlikely to rescind appointed arbitrators, unless there are exceptional 
circumstances. This means that the practical time limit for joinder requests is the 
confirmation of arbitrators, whether or not the rules of the institute say differently. 
Unanimous consent of all parties involved allows joinder at later stages of arbitration 
proceedings.  
Intervention is more contentious and is clearly a question of efficiency at the cost of 
confidentiality. The HKIAC and Swiss Rules allow for third-party intervention. The 
HKIAC is more restrictive, because intervention is allowed only for potential parties. The 
Swiss Rules allow for a wider range of third-person participation.  
There is an interesting semantic debate to be had in the Swiss Rules refer to “third-person 
participation”, as opposed the the other institutes reference to third-party participation. 
There is a clear difference in the restrictiveness of the choice of words. Person’ refers to 
the public at large, as well as potential parties; conversely,  ‘party’ only refers to potential 
parties, i.e. those that have consented to the arbitration agreement. 
I will now move on to a deeper analysis and a discussion on conclusions that can be 
reached from this examination. 
5.2.3 Discussion on findings and conclusions 
Joinder and intervention are mechanisms for allowing third persons to participate, or 
become a party to, an arbitration in progress or about to commence. The principle of 
bringing together all the relevant parties to a dispute enhances efficiency of dispute 
resolution. It can also make it fairer towards the parties themselves. Joinder is accepted at 
four of the five institutes studied and intervention is accepted at two institutes. I have 
identified four standard requirements for involuntary joinder and intervention, where 
applicable: 
1) The consent requirement means that parties have consented to an arbitration clause 
referencing the rules of an institution, which allows for joinder or intervention. 
Determination of consent is especially important if the requested party is a non-
signatory. Without consent the institute has no jurisdiction and there can be no final 
enforceable award. Therefore, the very essence of a fair, efficient, and economical 
commercial justice requires that there is demonstrable consent. 
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2) The connectivity requirement, meaning the same arbitration agreement for all parties. 
Joinder and intervention are applicable when new claims against a new party are made 
on the basis of the same arbitration agreement.  This means there is a stricter 
requirement of connectivity as compared to consolidation (explained later in this 
chapter).  
3) The temporal requirement is strict at most institutes. In practice, all the institutes which 
allow joinder and/or intervention set a time limit for its usage. This time limit is 
generally the nomination or confirmation of arbitrators, because multi-party arbitration 
proceedings mean that the nomination of arbitrators shifts to the arbitral institute.  
4) The procedural efficiency requirement is that, even if the request for joinder or 
intervention fulfills the other requirements, the institutes generally retain the option of 
declining joinder or intervention. This means that the institute requires there be some 
form of efficiency gain from the joinder or intervention which exceeds the loss of party 
autonomy in the selection of arbitrators and the increase in time consumption and 
costs. 
The increase in legal certainty that joinder and intervention allow are significant, because 
of the weak character of the res judicata effect in arbitration. A similar process on the 
same basic legal grounds can lead to a completely different award, allowing related parties 
a chance to enter into the same arbitration lessens this problem. 
It is unclear what effects lis pendens would have in such circumstances, because two 
arbitrations pending at the same institute between effectively the same parties on the same 
issues should give rise to lis pendens. Therefore, one solution is simply allowing these 
parties to join the process that has commenced earlier, which is better for all parties 
involved. 
Joinder and intervention are an adaptation by arbitration institutes to the growing 
complexity of international commerce.  Both mechanisms are a good step, which some 
institutes have taken bravely and others tentatively. It is clear that they have the potential 
of increasing fairness and efficiency of international commercial arbitration proceedings. 
5.3 Consolidation 
Consolidation is the act of combining two or more commenced arbitrations into one 
arbitration proceeding. Consolidation does not require all parties to have submitted to the 
same arbitration contract, or to have the same basis for the dispute. 
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Consolidation is usually initiated either by request of a party to at least one of the 
arbitration proceedings in progress, or when a new dispute emerges between the same 
parties that can be consolidated into the proceeding in progress. The request for 
consolidation is sent to the secretariat of the arbitration institution. After receipt of a 
request for consolidation the secretariat will ascertain whether it fulfills the requirement set 
by the arbitration institution’s rules, and decide whether the consolidation will go ahead. 
5.3.1 Typical cases 
Typical cases for consolidation concern arise when disputes have the same legal 
relationship (e.g., a construction contract), and have similar legal facts,(e.g., non-payment 
of bills).  
A typical case, where consolidation is beneficial is a construction project involving 
companies A, B, and C, who have all signed a main contract containing an arbitration 
clause. A, the main contractor, does not pay its bills. B and C separately lodge arbitration 
claims against A. Since the legal relationship is the same, the legal facts are similar, and all 
parties abide under the same arbitration clause, the cases should be consolidated into one 
process. 
Another typical case where consolidation should be considered is disputes involving joint 
venture agreements. If companies A, B, C, and D have concluded a joint venture 
agreement containing an arbitration clause and then disputes arise between the different 
parties, such disputes should all be consolidated into one proceeding. 
5.3.2 Study on the rules and practices 
Consolidation is possible at all the studied institutes, if all parties consent. The following 
study presupposes that at least one party does not consent to the consolidation of claims. 
Four out of five institutions have clear rules on consolidation under these conditions, while 
the SCC only allows for limited consolidation of new claims between the same parties. 
I will start by examining the independence of the institutes. Can an arbitration institute 
initiate a consolidation process if no party requests consolidation? 
The ICC had opted to use the word ‘may’ in the context of consolidation. The ICC 
Secretariat’s guide explains that the ICC Court retains the right to deny a request for 
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consolidation, even if it meets all the requirements of Article 10.200 Presumably this means 
that the ICC will consider other factors, such as process efficiency, before deciding on 
consolidation. 
The ICC can only consider consolidation upon the request of any party to any of the claims 
to be consolidated.201 The ICC contends that this increases procedural efficiency.202 When 
requesting consolidation parties should specify how and why the different disputes fit into 
one of the situations allowing for consolidation. The FAI, SCC and HKIAC rules are 
identical to the ICC rules regarding the institute’s autonomy to consolidate.203 
The Swiss Rules allow the institute to initiate consolidation on its own accord. Article 4 of 
the Swiss Rules states: “Where a Notice of Arbitration is submitted between parties 
already involved in other arbitral proceedings pending under these Rules, the Court may 
decide, after consulting with the parties and any confirmed arbitrator in all proceedings, 
that the new case shall be consolidated with the pending arbitral proceedings. The Court 
may proceed in the same way where a Notice of Arbitration is submitted between parties 
that are not identical to the parties in the pending arbitral proceedings… the Court shall 
take into account all relevant circumstances…” 
The secretariat of the SCCAM has stated in an interview that consolidation should only 
occur upon the request of one of the parties.204 The rules do not contain any reference to 
this; therefore, parties would be powerless should the arbitration institute remain 
inactive.205 
Timing is crucial when considering consolidation. The ICC Rules state that the institute 
may take into account any circumstances it considers relevant, such as whether any 
arbitrators have been confirmed or appointed in the arbitrations, and if so whether the 
appointed arbitrators the same or different.206 Since the ICC has opted to use the word 
‘may’, it has retained significant leeway in deciding what the relevant factors are when 
considering consolidation. Compared to the previous rules of the ICC, the rules from 2012 
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have expanded the timeframe for consolidation. Previously it could only be considered 
before terms of reference had been signed.207  
The SCC Rules contain no rules on timing. Hobér states that the travaux préparatoires of 
the rules include the presumption that arbitrators should be generous to new claims and 
set-off claims, as long as they fall within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators and do not cause 
obstruction of the proceedings.208 This means that new claims between the same parties 
can be consolidated much later into the process. 
The FAI is unlikely to consolidate arbitrations, if arbitrators have been confirmed, unless 
all parties consent.209 The rules, however, do not restrict the arbitration institute from 
consolidating cases that have been transmitted to the arbitrators. The FAI Rules simply 
state that the institute shall take into account whether arbitrators have been confirmed or 
appointed in any of the arbitrations and, if so, whether they are the same or different 
persons.210  
The Swiss Rules give the arbitration institute wide leeway to consolidate cases even after 
transmission to the arbitrators, according to commentators.211 The Swiss Rules themselves 
contain no mention of timing. This means “parties’ legal certainty” is unclear. 
Having dealt with institutional autonomy and timing, I will now move on to the material 
requirements of consolidation. According to ICC Rules, claims made under the same 
arbitration agreement can be consolidated without consent of all parties. These rules are 
also used by the HKIAC and FAI: as long as claims are under one arbitration agreement, 
there is a presumption of party consent to have all claims in one process. 212 
However, claims under more than one arbitration agreement can be consolidated without 
party consent if 1) the arbitrations are between the same parties, 2) the disputes are in 
connection to the same legal relationship, and 3) the ICC finds the arbitration agreements 
compatible.213 In addition, 4) the court’s discretion creates a requirement that it benefit the 
ICC or the process to consolidate. 
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I will now examine the three requirements in detail: 1) The Secretariat’s guide states that 
the new rules expand the ICC’s powers to consolidate, but the same-parties requirement is 
strict. For example, parties A, B, and C sign a contract containing an ICC arbitration 
agreement; A then initiates a first arbitration against B and C, later B initiates a second 
arbitration against C. In such situations, the ICC Secretariat suggests that it may be useful 
to bring all claims into a single arbitration.214 Thus, if the parties are clearly the same as in 
the agreement, consolidation is possible.  Earlier, the same-party requirement was even 
more restrictive, requiring same parties and same exact economic transaction, and that the 
was reason that most requests for consolidation were rejected..215  2) The same legal 
relationship means that all the contracts must be related to the same economic transaction. 
According to the Secretariat’s guide, this is usually not a problem. The same economic 
transaction can mean the same construction project, the same acquisition of a company, 
etc. Usually consolidation parties request consolidation, when the disputes are related.216 
According to commentators, this is the largest expansion of consolidation rules compared 
to the old rules, because previously the same legal relationship was a requirement, which 
in practice meant that all parties must have signed the same agreement. 217 The 2012 Rules 
open far more arbitrations for consolidation. 3) Compatible arbitration agreements are the 
final requirement. This will be dealt with later in this chapter. 4) The ICC’s discretion, 
meaning that the consolidation is judged as beneficial by the ICC; this distinction is made 
by the usage of the word “may” in Article 10.218 
The FAI Rules on consolidation are similar to those of the ICC. According to the FAI 
Rules, claims in arbitrations made under different arbitration agreements, but arising in 
connection with the same legal relationship, and compatible arbitration clauses may be 
consolidated.219  
Consolidation requests are most likely to be accepted if the parties are the same, the 
arbitration agreement is the same, and no arbitrators have been confirmed. The inverse is 
also true that when parties are different, the arbitration agreement is different, or arbitrators 
have been confirmed, consolidation is very unlikely. Savola says he cannot think of a 
scenario where the Board would agree to consolidation in such a setting, absent unanimous 
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party consent. It is also unlikely that consolidation will occur if the parties are different or 
the arbitrators have already been confirmed.220  Consolidation is almost impossible if it 
results in the revocation of confirmation of any of the arbitrators. All claims must also 
arise from the same legal relationship, meaning the same economic transaction and 
arbitration clauses must be compatible. 
Less similar to the ICC rules are the HKIAC rules, which only permit consolidation when 
either a) there is a common question or law or fact arising from all the arbitrations, or b) 
the rights of relief claimed are in respect to, or arise from, the same transaction or series of 
transactions -- and, as well, when the HKIAC finds the arbitration agreements to be 
compatible. However, the requirement of a common question of law or fact or relief, gives 
a more in-depth understanding as to what the circumstances considered are. The HKIAC 
considers consolidation beneficial if there are more commonalities between the 
arbitrations.  
The SCC is restrictive on consolidation. Article 11 of The SCC rules stipulate two relevant 
requirements for consolidation: firstly, that it concerns the same legal relationship; and 
secondly, that it is a new claim. The SCC rules, in practice, allow consolidation, outside 
unanimous consent, if the claims are made under the same agreement, which contains an 
arbitration clause. This means that the SCC will not allow consolidation if the parties are 
different, or the there are more than one agreement containing the arbitration clause. The 
SCC rules are therefore closer to the previous ICC rules in their restrictiveness. 
Article 4 of the Swiss Rules states that the arbitral tribunal shall take into account all 
relevant circumstances, including links between the case and progress already made in the 
pending proceedings; however, it does not require that the parties be the same. Thus, the 
Swiss Rules seem prima facie to be more ready to accept a true multi-party processes. 
In practice, all institutes require there to be a compatible arbitration clause. I will now 
examine what constitutes a compatible arbitration clause. 
The compatible arbitration clause requirement arises out of consent, because the 
jurisdiction of arbitral institutes comes from consent, without which there can be no 
binding final award.  
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According to Pair, a compatible arbitration clause must at least contain a reference to the 
same arbitration institute, seat of arbitration and language..221  ‘Language’ in this context 
means the wording of the arbitration clause.  
Identical language in arbitration clauses across different agreements legitimizes an 
assumption that parties intended to submit all disputes in connection with this transaction 
to a single tribunal.222  However, the degree of difference in the arbitration clause language 
necessary to constitute incompatibility is contested.223 Certainly, for consolidation to 
occur, all parties must at least have agreed to the same arbitral institution.224  
The Swiss Federal Court has published a decision in a case where two companies had 
several contracts between them. Each agreement contained its own incompatible 
arbitration clause, choosing different institutions, seats, and applicable laws.225 The arbitral 
panel decided that the case could not be consolidated. The Swiss Federal Court agreed, 
concluding that the inconsistencies between the contracts between the same parties 
indicated that they had not intended for cases to be consolidated.226 
Thus, incompatibility between agreements is present when the seat, the constitution of the 
arbitral tribunal, or the applicable procedure is different.227 Pair concludes that, in multiple-
contract scenarios, consolidation by reference to institutional rules is superseded by party 
agreement when there are “1) incompatible seats; 2) incompatible language; 3) 
incompatible choice of institutions; 5) incompatible applicable law either on merits or 
procedure; or 6) different number, qualification, or selection procedures for 
arbitrators.”228 It must be noted, however, that despite even a partial incompatibility 
automatically resulting in consolidation being rejected, even a total compatibility will not 
automatically result in a consolidation being approved.. 
In practice, when consolidation occurs, all institutes will consider parties as having waived 
their right to nominate an arbitrator, as it then becomes a multi-party proceeding.229 All 
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institutes also consolidate cases into the arbitration that has commenced first, unless all 
parties unanimously agree otherwise.230 
To summarize, the standards for consolidation are remarkably similar at the ICC, FAI and 
HKIAC. This is the de facto minimum standard that I think all arbitration institutes will 
follow. Minor differences exist between these three institutes, relative to the legal 
relationships and similarities of the parties and their claims, but in practice it is likely that, 
in similar cases, consolidation will occur at all these institutes in similar cases. The Swiss 
Rules allow, at least in principle, for more flexibility and autonomy for the arbitrators in 
deciding to consolidate, but -- as commentators have noted -- the practice is similar to the 
international standard, as espoused by the ICC. The SCC, conversely, has not implemented 
this minimum standard. It will be interesting to see whether or possibly when, the SCC 
finds itself pressured to adopt similar rules on consolidation. The following table may help 
clarify the practical differences on consolidation rules. 
 
 Requirement ICC FAI SCC HKIAC SWISS 
Demonstrable consent Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Compatible arbitration agreement Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Only on party request Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Timing: before nomination or 
confirmation of arbitrators. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Timing: After confirmation No1 No1 N/A No1 Yes 
Connectivity requirement Transaction Transaction Agreement Law/Fact/Relief General 
Benefits procedural efficiency or 
institution Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 
Waive rights to nominate 
arbitrators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1. In practice, even if the wording of rules state that it may be allowed after nomination of arbitrators. 
Table 2: Basic consolidation requirements (Source: Author) 
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5.3.3 Discussion on findings and conclusions 
The question that now remains is to systematize the findings of the examinations, as well 
as compare the results to the principles of fair, efficient, and economic commercial justice. 
Reference to an arbitration institute whose rules allow consolidation, expands party 
consent further than referencing the rules of an institute whose rules do not. The majority 
of institutes examined for this chapter have enacted rules extending party consent on 
consolidation to situations where unanimous consent is absent. I have identified four 
requirements that are common to most of the institutes examined: 
1) The requirement of consent means that, before any institute can consider involuntary 
consolidation, it must be certain of parties’ consent; in cases of non-signatory parties 
the existence of consent must be proven, and in cases of more than one arbitration 
agreement, the clauses must be compatible. If either facet of consent is missing, there 
can be no consolidation. Without consent, arbitral tribunals have no jurisdiction over 
the parties. It would be contrary to the concept of a fair, efficient, and economical 
commercial justice to render awards that are unenforceable. Nonexistence of consent 
renders consolidation impossible. 
2) The connectivity requirement is the second requirement set by most institutes. 
Connectivity means that there must be some connection between the cases, i.e. a reason 
why consolidation should be considered. The rules of institutes have worded the 
connectivity requirement in several ways: the same parties, the same economic 
transaction, the same legal relationship, a common question of law or even relief 
sought. The more connectivity there is between cases, the more likely an institute is to 
accept a request for consolidation. Consequently, if none of the connectivity 
requirements are met, then there is no reason to consolidate the cases. While it may be 
more efficient to group together unrelated cases, it would clearly be against the 
principle of a fair process. 
3) The temporal requirement, meaning that a request must be submitted before a certain 
point in the arbitration process. Most of the institutes studied have stated, either 
directly in their rules or through commentary, that a request for consolidation is likelier 
to succeed the earlier it is submitted in the process. The chance of a successful request 
for consolidation after nomination or confirmation of arbitrators is miniscule, and 
possible only in exceptional circumstances.  
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4) The procedural efficiency requirement is considered only if all the other requirements 
are met. Even when consent exists, the cases are connected, and the request has been 
submitted within a reasonable time, there must be a legitimate efficiency gain that 
outweighs the restrictions multi-party processes place on parties. Restrictions such as 
inability to nominate preferred arbitrators should be taken into account. Therefore, 
consolidation should only be considered where the efficiency and legal certainty gains 
outweigh the costs to a fair and equitable process.  
The arbitral institute must bear in mind the balance between the right of the parties to a fair 
and equitable process, and the systemic efficiency and legal certainty of arbitral awards. 
The flexibility of the arbitration process is restricted in multi-party proceedings, by the 
simple fact that more parties means less possibilities for unanimous consent. Multi-party 
proceedings are also likely to take longer for individual parties than smaller bi-party 
processes. 
I will now discuss the findings and evaluate the mechanisms in general from the 
perspective of fair, efficient, and economical commercial justice. 
5.4 Critical remarks and future considerations 
Having examined the mechanisms that allow for joinder, intervention, and consolidation in 
international commercial arbitration at select arbitral institutes, I will now examine the 
current state of affairs with regards to multi-party and multi-contract rules at these 
institutes. The arbitral institutes have responded to the increasing complexity of 
international commerce by amending the rules to allow for a more flexible multi-party 
process. There has been a significant shift towards an international standard on joinder and 
consolidation, while intervention is slightly controversial. 
Among the studied institutes, joinder is accepted among those which have amended their 
rules after 2011. Allowing joinder is only a minor expansion of consent, because the 
requirements are so strict and confidentiality is protected. Joinder provides some tools for 
dealing with problems of lis pendens and res judicata by allowing more of the connected 
disputes to be handled in one process, thus circumventing problematic preclusion rules 
which may or may not apply. It also enhances the efficiency of the arbitration process at a 
cost to party autonomy. 
Among studied institutes, involuntary consolidation is accepted at all, which have amended 
their rules after 2011. Involuntary consolidation is a considerable expansion of party 
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consent, because the requirements of connectivity are less strict. Compared to joinder, 
where the arbitration agreement must be the same, consolidation requires only 
connectivity, such as the same economic transaction, or the same parties. The systemic 
efficiency gains from consolidation are considerable. However, there are questions of 
fairness and cost effectiveness for the parties: minor parties in a contractual web may be 
intimidated by consolidation, because it increases their costs. Furthermore, as is the case 
with all multi-party processes, consolidation limits party autonomy in the selection of 
arbitrations etc. That said, consolidation can counteract legal uncertainty in arbitration, by 
allowing for connected disputes to be handled at the same time rather than in serial or in 
parallel. This counteracts the problems of res judicata as well as parties’ strategic actions, 
such as multi-shotting, i.e. effectively trying the same issue several times.  
Intervention is the most controversial of the three mechanisms, which is interesting. Only 
two of the five institutes studied allow for intervention of third persons or parties in an 
arbitration process. The HKIAC has chosen a restrictive approach, where the requirements 
are strict, and identical with joinder. The Swiss Rules have chosen an extremely expansive 
approach to both joinder and intervention, by referencing only third-person participation, 
meaning that the requirements are much less strict than at the other institutes. It is 
interesting that the ICC considers intervention impossible but allows for consolidation, 
since both can lead to the same results. A party can commence an arbitration against a 
party to another arbitration and then ask for the cases to be consolidated; thus the end 
result would be the same, as allowing for intervention. The ICC secretariat’s reasoning 
against intervention on the grounds of confidentiality is a bit hollow viewed from this 
perspective. 
There are clearly two camps within the institutes studied: the more conservative camp that 
follows the lead of the ICC and the more expansive such as the Swiss Rules. It is unclear 
how other international arbitral institutes will amend their rules, and it will be interesting to 
see whether they follow the ICC lead, or opt for a more expansive regime. 
The balance between systemic efficiency and fairness and cost for individual parties has 
shifted towards systemic efficiency in the latest wave of rules amendments. It is clear from 
surveys that the users of arbitration have clearly stated that they wish for more mechanisms 
to deal with complex situations, but at what cost?  
Party autonomy decreases when bi-party arbitration becomes a multi-party arbitration,  
parties may no longer appoint their own arbitrators; rather, they must trust that appointees 
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of the institute. The flexibility of the arbitration process also decreases, since more parties 
mean fewer possibilities to streamline proceedings through unanimous decisions. A multi-
party process is also likely to be more expensive for the individual party than is bi-party 
proceeding.  
Practitioners view any efficiency enhancement as a good thing. However, in discussions 
with prominent Finnish lawyers, there was doubt if the new rules would actually hinder 
party obstruction Ultimately, arbitration is only as good as the arbitrator(s) selected. In 
general, practitioners felt that the more flexible the rules are for the arbitrators, the better 
the results are, since they give the arbitrators the possibility to coax obstructing parties. 
Consolidation and joinder have become a mainstay at many of the surveyed arbitral 
institutions. However, the mechanism is only as good as the people implementing it, i.e. 
the arbitrators and the institution. Therefore, it is as of yet unclear whether the mechanism 
will yield significant improvements to fair, efficient, and economical justice. 
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6 A Practical Guide for the User 
This chapter is a short practical guide to the user of arbitration. The chapter aims to 
illuminate the practical differences of the treatment of multi-party cases, and help in the 
choice of institution. 
Dispute resolution is perhaps the most overlooked part of contract negotiations. Parties 
should pay more attention to dispute resolution in long-term projects and economic 
transactions. Often, signing the deal becomes far more important than considering possible 
problems, and thus an arbitration clause contains the bare minimum -- a choice of 
institution, and perhaps a choice of laws. This means parties may be unaware how far their 
consent extends in disputes. They might be deprived of the possibility to choose an 
arbitrator, for example. 
Paying close attention to dispute resolution clauses in contracts is good long-term 
planning. Multi-party and multi-contract rules need consideration when the contract 
contains multiple parties or it is part of a web of contracts related to an economic 
transaction, or project. The following short questions and answers will help to make an 
informed choice: 
a) Is it beneficial for us that all possible disputes are handled in single process, or should 
we opt out? 
Factors which determine when multi-party or multi-contract proceedings are beneficial are 
at least the following: 1) are we the larger party near the center of the contractual web, for 
example, the main contractor of a construction project; 2) can we benefit from multi-shot 
dispute processes, i.e. from having more than one possibility to try the dispute; and 3) can 
prohibitive costs of complex arbitration discourage our smaller partners from raising 
disputes?  
Conversely if 1) we are the small party performing a simple part of a large project; and/or 
2) if possible disputes are time-critical, i.e. should be resolved quickly; then we should 
avoid dispute resolution clauses that involve the risk of multi-party proceedings.  
Opting out of multi-party and multi-contract proceedings is possible by choosing an 
arbitration institute that does not allow joinder, intervention, or consolidation, without 
unanimous party consent.  
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It is easy to opt out of multi-contract processes by choosing different institutions, seats and 
language of the clauses in the different contracts -- in other words, making the arbitration 
clauses incompatible. No institution will consolidate cases where the arbitration clauses are 
clearly incompatible. 
b) Is it beneficial for us that we, or another party, to the contract can invite others to the 
same process? 
This question is closely related to the first question: for example, if we have a contract with 
our bank, which has given us a guarantee that is related to the main contract. In such cases 
it may be beneficial, if we could request that the bank be allowed to join the dispute 
process. 
c) Is it beneficial for us that third parties can intervene? 
This is a complex question, and one that I am unable to thoroughly answer within the 
confines of this thesis. Cases where this is beneficial would be very large projects with a 
multitude of contractual relationships between the different parties, where the resolution of 
one dispute may lead to another dispute or have a significant impact on another dispute. Or 
where it is a question of international law, or the arbitration takes place with a national 
government or through an institution such as the WTO, where there would be substantial 
legal grey areas. In such cases, the Swiss Chambers are the most liberal in regard to third-
person participation. 
d) Is it beneficial for us that the institution can consolidate cases, where we are a party? 
And if so, under what circumstances? 
If we are the main contractor with many sub-contractors who are all bound by the same 
arbitration agreement with a compatible arbitration clause, and we can minimize the cost 
of disputes, then it may be beneficial. Similar benefits may be had if we are at the center of 
a large contractual web between a few parties, i.e. it is a multi-party multi-contract 
situation. However, it may also invite parties to raise smaller disputes than they would 
otherwise, since they could share costs.  
For small parties to a large contract, it is unlikely that a consolidation clause is in their best 
interests, because it is likely to make any dispute bigger, more costly and take longer to 
resolve. If we are the bigger party in a contractual web, we should consider creating 
firewalls, so that disputes can be managed. By ‘firewalls’ I mean incompatible arbitration 
clauses or opt-outs from multi-party processes.  
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Since different institutions allow for consolidation on slightly differing rules, perhaps the 
most interesting problematic is the question of the same legal relationship, same economic 
transaction, or common legal question.  
If the benefits outweigh the risks and we want a unified process, then we should choose the 
institution that is more liberal with its application of joinder and consolidation, such as the 
FAI, HKIAC, or Swiss Chambers.  
If a party must compromise, or have no opinion, then the party should perhaps adopt what 
will undoubtedly become the de facto standard, i.e. the ICC. If we wish to opt-out as far as 
possible from multi-party proceedings, we should either write the opt-out into the clause, 
or choose an institution that is conservative with regards to joinder and consolidation, such 
as the SCC. 
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7 Multi-party arbitration mechanisms by themselves do not enhance 
the attractiveness of Finland as a seat of arbitration 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will examine the situation in Finland from the perspective of improving 
the attractiveness of Finland as a seat of arbitration. 
The seat of arbitration, or lex fori, is important, because it determines the legal framework 
for arbitral proceedings and the arbitral awards. Furthermore, the law of the arbitral seat 
provides for mandatory rules applicable to the proceedings, form, notification, correction, 
and annulment of an arbitral award.231  
The two main questions examined are:  1) whether the new rules on multi-party arbitration 
proceedings will have an effect on attractiveness; and 2) what other action can be taken to 
improve the attractiveness of Finland as a seat of arbitration. 
7.2 Situation Today 
The Finnish Arbitration Institute received 69 arbitration requests in 2012. A quarter of 
which were international cases.232 Ad hoc arbitration is very common in Finland: in fact, 
the FAI estimates that only about half of all arbitrations in Finland are institutional.233 The 
closest competitor to the FAI is the SCC Institute in Sweden, which received 177 
arbitration requests in 2012, with 92 of those being international.234  
7.3 The role of multi-party mechanisms in choice of seat 
Surveys from 2006 and 2008 have shown that the lack of multi-party mechanisms, expense 
and time were seen as the major drawbacks of international commercial arbitration.235 The 
decision to create multi-party mechanisms through rules amendments at the various 
international arbitration institutes is a response to this need.  
The created new mechanisms for dealing with multi-party and multi-contract situations 
have been successful; a new survey from 2012 shows that multi-party mechanisms are no 
                                                
231 Born 2009, p. 306. 
232  Finnish Arbitration Institute. 'Statistics' (2013), http://arbitration.fi/en/statistics/, accessed 12.12.2013. 
233 Lehtinen & Yildiz 2013. 
234  SCC Institute. 'The SCC in numbers - 2012' (2013), http://www.sccinstitute.com/statistik-2.aspx, 
accessed 12.12.2013. 
235 Mistelis & Baltag 2008b, p. 95. 
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longer lacking in international commercial arbitration. 236  Today, basic multi-party 
mechanisms are standard at most arbitration institutes that have amended their rules after 
2010. It is likely that this trend will continue, as more institutes perceive the new standards 
as obligatory. This is particularly true for institutes that are not extremely well known or 
world-leading.  
The new rules adopted by the FAI are a necessary step towards becoming a more attractive 
arbitration destination, because there is really no alternative. A prominent Finnish attorney 
remarked that adopting the commonly accepted rules is a requirement, since deviating too 
much from the standard becomes a liability for the institution, at least if it is trying to drum 
up business.  
The next part of this chapter deals with what proactive steps could be taken in Finland to 
enhance the attractiveness of Finland as a seat of arbitration, in light of recent surveys. 
7.4 Other factors affecting choice of seat 
Surveys have found that parties generally want an arbitration-friendly regime, meaning 
little interference in the arbitral process and easily enforceable awards. In addition, the seat 
must be perceived as neutral.237  
The most important factors when choosing a seat of arbitration are: 1) formal legal 
infrastructure at the seat (62% of respondents); 2) law governing the substance of the 
dispute (46% of respondents); 3) convenience (45% of respondents); and 4) general 
infrastructure (e.g. costs, access, physical infrastructure) (31% of respondents).238   
On the basis of the study, I will now analyze the Finnish regulatory system in brief and 
remark on possible ways to improve Finland’s attractiveness as a seat for arbitration. 
Finland fulfills (1) the requirements of the formal legal infrastructure at the seat well, since 
Finnish law is arbitration friendly and prizes neutrality and impartiality. Furthermore, 
Finland is a signatory to the New York Convention.239  Finnish arbitration law is also 
compatible with the UNCITRAL Model Law.240 
                                                
236  Zrilic & Brekoulakis 2012. 
237 Moses 2012, p. 47. 
238  Zrilic & Brekoulakis 2012. 
239 In the 2012 Study 34 % said that neutrality and impartiality are are the most influental of the formal legal 
infrastructure factor and 20 % said that being a signatory to the New York Convention was the most 
important factor.  
240  Möller 1984 (Updated 2008). 
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The following factors were identified in the 2012 Study as the most important factors 
regarding the convenience of the seat: the most important was efficiency of the local court 
system; second most important was language; third most important was established 
contacts with lawyers operating at the seat; fourth the location of parties; and a finally 
cultural familiarity. Lack of bribery was also seen as an important factor. 241 
The Finnish courts are generally regarded as effective.242 Bribery is a non-existent problem 
in Finland. Finnish arbitrators in general are apt at English, but may lack knowledge of 
other languages. One of the key differences between Finland and Sweden is that there are 
several excellent and recent English language books on arbitration proceedings in 
Sweden243, whereas currently there are no recent extensive books on arbitration in Finland.  
The 2012 Study also highlighted that the existence of specialized lawyers in the location 
affects the choice of seat, with 34 % of respondents saying this is an important factor.244 
This may also be a significant factor; although there are many excellent lawyers 
specializing in arbitration in Finland, there are not very many that are well known 
internationally. However, many of Finland’s largest law firms have expanded to Sweden 
and Russia; this is an excellent first step in increasing familiarity of Finland in these 
countries. Both countries would be excellent locations for marketing Finland as a seat of 
arbitration.  
Increasing research and publication of relevant literature in English and perhaps other 
languages would improve the familiarity of Finland abroad. Furthermore, Finnish experts 
should visit relevant conferences and give presentations. The FAI needs increased 
visibility, because it is unlikely that people will choose Finland as seat of arbitration unless 
they are aware of the high quality of adjudication. 
The 2012 Study highlighted that very few respondents view the actual arbitration laws as a 
very important factor in the choice of the seat of arbitration, as long as they are compatible 
with the New York Convention. Therefore, it is unlikely that adopting the UNCITRAL 
Model Law would, in itself, lead to more international commercial arbitrations in Finland.   
                                                
241  Zrilic & Brekoulakis 2012. 
242  Dubois et al. 2013, p. 174-175. 
243  See for example: Hobér: International Commercial Arbitration in Sweden and Andersson et al: 
Arbitration in Sweden. 
244  Zrilic & Brekoulakis 2012. 
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Arbitration institutions rely on their good name and thus, successful arbitrations give rise 
to more arbitration proceedings.  
Another possible idea is to develop the Finnish arbitration legislation and the rules of the 
FAI so as to make the extremely efficient solution of complex arbitration proceedings 
possible. However, this may be too radical at this juncture, and might backfire.  
Radically increasing the amount of arbitration that takes place in Finland is difficult, and 
would require Finland and the FAI finding a niche market. New markets for arbitration are 
opening up online; perhaps online dispute resolution could be an answer. However, this 
would require a radical re-thinking of the process. Proper English-language books on 
arbitration in Finland would be good start  --- however, at the moment they are sorely 
lacking. 
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8 Conclusions 
This dissertation set out to examine multi-party mechanisms in international commercial 
arbitration from a Finnish and international perspective. There have been no studies on the 
rules of joinder, intervention, and consolidation that include the FAI rules. The institutes 
examined have enacted similar but slightly differing solutions to the problems of multi-
party and multi-contract arbitrations. The thesis also sought to examine whether the 
development of multi-party mechanisms would make Finland more attractive as a seat of 
arbitration, and to answer the following two research questions: 
1) What are the similarities and differences of solutions chosen at international arbitration 
institutions with regards to multi-party mechanisms, and do they enhance the 
effectiveness of arbitration proceedings? 
2) Can development of multi-party mechanisms make Finland more attractive as a seat of 
arbitration? 
Flexible legal dogmatics was used as the method, because it allows for the situational 
flexibility in the examination of legal sources. Arbitration is an opaque field, where unlike 
national courts and decisions, it is hard to get original authoritative source material. Thus, a 
flexible method leads to the best results. Functionally analyzing the solutions chosen at 
arbitration institutes helps to understand their differences. This analysis was conducted on 
three levels, local, transnational, and global. 
The main findings are chapter-specific, and summarized in detail in their the respective 
chapters. Following is a short summary of findings related to the research questions: 
1) The mechanisms created at international arbitration institutes are similar and all have 
the same main requirements: consent, connectivity, timing and procedural efficiency. 
Arbitration institutes that have amended their rules after 2011 have enacted similar 
rules. All of the chosen solutions expand party consent and allow for more involvement 
of third parties or connected processes. Most of the studied institutions have chosen to 
enact similar rules to that of the ICC, which can be said to be the international 
standard. The Swiss Rules are more expansive towards party consent by design; 
however, in practice, the end results are not dissimilar. 
2) The development of multi-party mechanisms does not, in itself, make Finland more 
attractive as a seat of arbitration. However, it is a prerequisite, because the new 
mechanisms have become a de facto standard in international commercial arbitration. 
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Studies show that being too liberal or too conservative will not attract new arbitration 
users.  
It is clear from this limited study of five international arbitration institutes that 
international commercial arbitration is evolving to better handle complex international 
commerce better by offering slightly differing solutions to the problems of multi-party and 
multi-contract disputes. The chosen solutions also help lessen the problems of lis pendens 
and res judicata in international commercial arbitration, because there are fewer parties 
outside that are dependent on the ongoing process. It is likely that future amendments of 
institutional rules at various arbitration institutes will see the enactment of similar multi-
party and multi-contract rules. This improves procedural efficiency at some cost to fairness 
and party autonomy. It seems that the arbitration community has found this an acceptable 
trade-off. 
Finland and the FAI have taken the first steps towards improving the attractiveness of 
Finland as a seat of arbitration by adopting rules that are up to international standards. It is 
clear that this is not in itself enough; rather, a more comprehensive program for improving 
the attractiveness and image of Finland is needed.  
The theoretical case for multi-party mechanisms in international arbitration is their 
enhancement of the efficiency and the fairness of the arbitration process. This study 
supports this hypothesis from the system perspective. Furthermore, this dissertation shows 
that this hypothesis has been put into practice by several arbitral institutions.  
Recommendations for future research on the basis of this dissertation can be divided into 
three categories: 
a) Evaluation of the effectiveness of multi-party mechanisms. This dissertation can only 
scratch the surface, because the new rules have only been in effect a very short time. 
Therefore, more research is needed into the actual usage of these new mechanisms, 
because rules are one thing, and praxis is quite often another.  
Possible research questions could be: for example, do the new mechanisms actually 
lead to more efficient proceedings? This can be researched empirically: for example, 
do the new mechanisms, when used, actually lower costs to parties. Another alternative 
approach is to interview users and practitioners to see how they view the new 
mechanisms. 
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b) Comparing the differences between institutions to find the best solution. A more in-
depth comparison of arbitral institutions should be undertaken. Perhaps using typical 
cases to examine how institutions would respond to requests and interviewing users, 
practitioners and representatives of the arbitral institutions. 
c) Finnish situation. Finland and the FAI need to create a program for improving the 
attractiveness of Finland as seat of arbitration. This requires further research to be able 
to ascertain the best ways to spend limited resources. Some research topics include: 
identifying potential customers and their needs; developing practical and scholarly 
handbooks that meet international standards; and determining what kind of legal 
regulation Finland needs in order to be attractive. 
This study has offered a legal dogmatic perspective on important developments within the 
international commercial arbitration community. The study was conducted through reading 
of materials provided by institutions, and by authors close to institutions. As a direct 
consequence of this methodology, the study has a number of limitations, which need to be 
considered.   
The availability of materials is problematic, since institutions only publish a small subset 
of their cases, and authors close to institutions have their own interests and have chosen 
what to include and exclude. Examination of the Finnish situation finds a lack of research 
the biggest issue and has concentrated on identifying new problems and questions that 
require study. 
The dissertation has made a contribution to the body of knowledge related to multi-party 
mechanisms in international commercial arbitration. It has expanded the knowledge of 
solutions chosen by several institutions that have recently adopted new rules. The 
prevailing viewpoint is that multi-party mechanisms universally enhance the efficiency of 
complex arbitration proceedings. However, as this study has found, while this may be true 
from the system perspective, it is not always true for the individual users of arbitration. 
Furthermore, this dissertation has contributed to the discussion in Finland by evaluating the 
effects of multi-party rules, as well as raising relevant questions and problems that are 
pressing if Finland is to increase its attractiveness as a seat of arbitration. 
